Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University

Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law
Hofstra Law Faculty Scholarship
2019

(Un)Civil Denaturalization
Cassandra Burke Robertson
Irina D. Manta
Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Cassandra Burke Robertson and Irina D. Manta, (Un)Civil Denaturalization, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 402 (2019)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship/1249

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Hofstra Law Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra
Law. For more information, please contact lawlas@hofstra.edu.

41254-nyu_94-3 Sheet No. 46 Side B

05/14/2019 08:58:42

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\94-3\NYU303.tx t

unknown

Seq: 1

14-MAY-19

8:49

(UN)CIVIL DENATURALIZATION
CASSANDRA BURKE ROBERTSON† & IRINA D. MANTA‡
Over the last fifty years, naturalized citizens in the United States were able to feel a
sense of finality and security in their rights. Denaturalization, wielded frequently as
a political tool in the McCarthy era, had become exceedingly rare. Indeed, denaturalization was best known as an adjunct to criminal proceedings brought against
former Nazis and other war criminals who had entered the country under false
pretenses.
Denaturalization is no longer so rare. Naturalized citizens’ sense of security has
been fundamentally shaken by policy developments in the last five years. The
number of denaturalization cases is growing, and if current trends continue, it will
continue to increase dramatically. This growth began under the Obama administration, which used improved digital tools to identify potential cases of naturalization
fraud from years and decades ago. The Trump administration, however, is taking
denaturalization to new levels as part of its overall immigration crackdown. It has
announced plans for a denaturalization task force. And it is pursuing denaturalization as a civil-litigation remedy and not just a criminal sanction—a choice that
prosecutors find advantageous because civil proceedings come with a lower burden
of proof, no guarantee of counsel to the defendant, and no statute of limitations. In
fact, the first successful denaturalization under this program was decided on summary judgment in favor of the government in 2018. The defendant was accused of
having improperly filed an asylum claim twenty-five years ago, but he was never
personally served with process and he never made an appearance in the case, either
on his own or through counsel. Even today, it is not clear that he knows he has lost
his citizenship.
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The legal status of denaturalization is murky, in part because the Supreme Court
has long struggled to articulate a consistent view of citizenship and its prerogatives.
Nonetheless, the Court has set a number of significant limits on the government’s
attempts to remove citizenship at will—limits that are inconsistent with the administration’s current litigation policy. This Article argues that stripping Americans of
citizenship through the route of civil litigation not only violates substantive and
procedural due process, but also infringes on the rights guaranteed by the
Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, (un)civil denaturalization undermines the constitutional safeguards of democracy.
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Denaturalization is makinga comeback in the United States. For
half a century, denaturalization largely disappeared from American
policy.1 Civ il actions seekingto strip indiv iduals’ citizenship hav e been

R
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ex ceedingly rare in the last fifty years. When they occurred, they were
often the product of human rights groups’ efforts to identify former
Nazis and war criminals who had used forged and fraudulent credentials to av oid accountability.2
Now, howev er, the gov ernment has ramped up the number of
denaturalization cases it is filing. News reports detail how gov ernment
officials are searching through old records, digitizing fingerprint
records from decades ago, and looking for irregularities that might
lead to new denaturalization actions.3
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has requested
fundingto institute a task force aimed at bringingmore civ il and criminal actions against indiv iduals who were allegedly unqualified to
obtain citizenship. The program has so far identified 887 potential
leads, and ex pects to rev iew another 700,000 naturalized citizens’ files,
to see if there are grounds for potential denaturalization.4
These additional denaturalization proceedings might seem insignificant giv en the sheer number of naturalized citizens in the country.
Ev ery year, approx imately 700,000 indiv iduals become naturalized citizens of the United States. There are nearly 20 million naturalized citizens currently residing in the United States, representing
approx imately 6.5% of the nation’s citizens.5 Naturalized citizens
enjoy the full benefits and responsibility of U.S. citizenship, including
the right to v ote in state and federal elections, the right to trav el with
a U.S. passport, the right and duty to serv e on a jury, and legal protection against deportation proceedings.6 In fact, the Supreme Court has

05/14/2019 08:58:42

See infra Section II.C.
See Nick Miroff, Scanning Immigrants’ Old Fingerprints, U.S. Threatens to Strip
Thousands of Citizenship, WASH. POST (June 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/scanning-immigrants-old-fingerprints-us-threatens-to-stripthousands-of-citizenship/2018/06/13/2230d8a2-6f2e-11e8-afd5-778aca903bbe_story.html.
4 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, OPERATIONS
AND SUPPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2019 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 21 (2018), https://
www.dhs.gov /sites/default/files/publications/U.S.%20Immigration%20and%20Customs%
20Enforcement.pdf.
5 Ana Gonzalez-Barrera & Jens Manuel Krogstad, Naturalization Rate Among U.S.
Immigrants Up Since 2005, with India Among the Biggest Gainers, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 18,
2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/18/naturalization-rate-among-u-simmigrants-up-since-2005-with-india-among-the-biggest-gainers (prov iding the number of
naturalized citizens); HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY
CITIZENSHIP STATUS, https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/distribution-by-citizenshipstatus (last v isited Dec. 27, 2018) (notingthat the number of United States citizens liv ing
in the fifty states is approx imately 295 million as of 2017).
6 Gonzalez-Barrera & Krogstad, supra note 5.
3
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7 Knauer v . United States, 328 U.S. 654, 658 (1946) (“Citizenship obtained through
naturalization is not a second-class citizenship. It has been said that citizenship carries with
it all of the rights and prerogativ es of citizenship obtained by birth in this country ‘sav e that
of eligibility to the Presidency.’” (quotingLuria v . United States, 231 U.S. 9, 22 (1913))).
8 Stephanie deGooyer, Why Trump’s Denaturalization Task Force Matters, NATION
(July 10, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/trumps-denaturalization-task-forcematters.
9 Id.
10 Anthony D. Bianco et al., Civil Denaturalization: Safeguarding the Integrity of U.S.
Citizenship, U.S. ATT’YS’ BULL., July 2017, at 6, https://www.justice.gov /usao/page/file/
984701/download.
11 See id. at 8.
12 See infra Section I.B.1.
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said, the only difference between the rights of naturalized citizens and
those born in the United States is eligibility to serv e as President.7
But ev en if the program results in only a few hundred additional
proceedings, it still creates a culture of fear that permeates through
the community of immigrants and naturalized citizens. As one
reporter stated, “Fear also threads through people fast, and spreads
quickly, especially online. After the immigration agency’s announcement, many naturalized citizens were left questioning the v alidity of
an immigration status they assumed would always be safe.”8 People
may begin second-guessing their decision to seek naturalization;
“afraid of beingtargeted or tripped up in a lie, [they] may now nev er
pursue naturalization at all, ev en if they are eligible.”9
This fear is compounded by denaturalization procedures. First,
although U.S. Attorneys often hav e discretion ov er whether to file
cases in the civ il or criminal justice systems, the Trump administration
is increasingly relyingon ordinary civ il litigation to seek denaturalization. In fact, in a 2017 article in the U.S. Attorneys’ Bulletin, sev eral
gov ernment officials “encourage[d] Federal prosecutors to consider
referring cases for civ il denaturalization when a case is declined for
prosecution.”10 They wrote that filing civ il proceedings rather than
criminal actions offers sev eral “benefits”: Civ il litigation carries a
lower burden of proof, there is no statute of limitations on civ il denaturalization, there is no right to a jury trial, and there is no right to
appointed counsel.11
While these factors may make denaturalization cases easier for
the gov ernment to win, they also create substantial due process risks
for the defendant. Two recent cases highlight the inequities arising
when civ il litigation puts citizenship at risk. In the first case, the defendant may be unaware ev en now that he has lost his citizenship.
Because he was not personally serv ed, we do not know whether he
had actual notice of the denaturalization proceedingagainst him.12 At
any rate, he did not show up to the hearing, and no attorney entered
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an appearance on his behalf. As a result, the gov ernment was able to
obtain a summary judgment grantingdenaturalization.13 In the second
case, the defendant pleaded guilty to helpingher boss commit financial fraud.14 Although it is undisputed that the defendant played only
a v ery minor role in her boss’s underlying fraud, did not personally
benefit from it, and helped the FBI build a case against her employer,
the gov ernment nev ertheless contends that her plea demonstrates that
she lacks the good moral character necessary to qualify for citizenship.
This Article ex plores denaturalization’s uneasy fit into civ il litigation. It ex amines the history of denaturalization policy and how the
Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence pushed back against
statutory encroachments on citizenship rights. It argues that ev en
though the Supreme Court has more recently applied a more limited
and tex tualist approach to denaturalization cases, civ il denaturalization contradicts the due process guarantee that the Court has dev eloped in other contex ts. The Article concludes that civ il
denaturalization v iolates both the procedural and substantiv e due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment and that it is fundamentally inconsistent with the democratic framework established by
the United States Constitution.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I ex plains current denaturalization law and policy, and it ex plores how that law and policy play
out in recent denaturalization actions. Part II looks at the historical
basis of denaturalization actions. It ex amines how the gov ernment’s
denaturalization policy ex panded during the early part of the twentieth century, as well as how it declined in the years after the Red
Scare. Part III turns to the constitutional law of denaturalization. It
analyzes the changinglimits that the Supreme Court has put on denaturalization actions ov er time, and concludes that the Court has struggled to articulate a consistent v iew of citizenship rights. Finally, Part
IV ex amines how current denaturalization law and policy fit within
the constitutional structure set out in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. It argues that civ il denaturalization actions do not comport
with constitutional protections: first, civ il denaturalization actions v iolate procedural due process requirements; second, civ il denaturalization actions contrav ene both the Citizenship Clause and the
substantiv e due process protections offered by the Fourteenth
Amendment; and finally, such actions undermine constitutional protections of citizen sov ereignty.
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I
THE RENEWED THREAT OF DENATURALIZATION
Although denaturalization was a relativ ely common action during
the first half of the twentieth century, it has been used ex ceedingly
rarely since 1967. That year, the Supreme Court effectiv ely limited the
potential grounds for denaturalization to fraud and illegal procurement.15 In the years after that, denaturalization was rarely used ev en
when it was statutorily authorized. Instead, the Department of Justice
used its prosecutorial authority primarily to seek the denaturalization
of former Nazi officials and other war criminals, and did not typically
go after more ordinary cases. Now, howev er, the number of denaturalization cases is growingand gainingsignificant public attention.16
There are two primary mechanisms for seekingdenaturalization
under current law.17 The first is through a criminal naturalizationfraud proceeding.18 When an indiv idual is conv icted of
“[p]rocurement of citizenship or naturalization unlawfully” under 18
U.S.C. § 1425, the court is required to rev oke the defendant’s naturalization.19 The second mechanism, and the focus of this Article, is
through a civ il proceeding under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). This section
allows a U.S. Attorney to file suit seekingto rev oke citizenship on two
potential grounds: first, that the naturalization was “illegally procured,” (that is, the indiv idual did not meet the statutory requirements
for citizenship, includingthe requirement for “good moral character”)
or second, that the naturalization was “procured by concealment of a
material fact or by willful misrepresentation.”20 Because civ il denatu-

05/14/2019 08:58:42

See infra Sections III.B, III.C.
See Patricia Mazzei, Congratulations, You Are Now a U.S. Citizen. Unless Someone
Decides Later You’re Not, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/
23/us/denaturalize-citizen-immigration.html (“Since President Trump took office, the
number of denaturalization cases has been growing, part of a campaign of aggressiv e
immigration enforcement that now promises to include ev en the most protected class of
legal immigrants: naturalized citizens.”).
17 See Hanna E. Borsilli, Comment, But It’s Just a Little White Lie! An Analysis of the
Materiality Requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 1425, 122 DICKINSON L. REV. 675, 681–88 (2018)
(prov idinga detailed ex planation of the grounds for denaturalization).
18 See Bianco et al., supra note 10, at 6.
19 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e) (2012) (“When a person shall be conv icted [of] . . . knowingly
procuringnaturalization in v iolation of law, the court . . . shall thereupon rev oke, set aside,
and declare v oid the final order admittingsuch person to citizenship, and shall declare the
certificate of naturalization of such person to be canceled.”). Conv iction also carries a
potential term of incarceration of ten to twenty-fiv e years. 18 U.S.C. § 1425 (2012).
20 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).
16
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ralization proceedings are considered equitable in nature, they traditionally carry no right to a jury.21
When the court grants denaturalization, the indiv idual who loses
citizenship rev erts back to the immigration status held immediately
prior to naturalization—often the status of lawful permanent resident.22 Further proceedings may change that status, howev er, potentially leading to a remov al order requiring deportation.23
Denaturalization relates back to the original grant of citizenship; the
Immigration and Nationality Act prov ides that denaturalization “shall
be effectiv e as of the original date” of naturalization.24
This “relation back” policy can hav e serious consequences. When
a civ il denaturalization case finds that the defendant has gained citizenship “by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation,”25 then the spouse and child of the defendant may lose their
citizenship as well. Under the statute, the indiv iduals who gained citizenship “by v irtue of such naturalization of such parent or spouse” are
deemed to lose citizenship, ev en if they reside in the United States.26
Of course, a child who otherwise qualified for citizenship (for
ex ample, one born in the United States) would not hav e obtained citizenship though the parent’s naturalization, and would therefore not
be at risk for loss of citizenship.27 But a child born abroad would lose
citizenship in such a case. One court has ev en held that such a child is
not entitled to the appointment of a guardian ad litem in the parent’s
denaturalization case, as the child’s citizenship rights “must rise or fall
solely on the basis of the rights of the . . . parent from whom they
41254-nyu_94-3 Sheet No. 49 Side B
05/14/2019 08:58:42

21 See Bianco et al., supra note 10, at 8 & n.25 (citingUnited States v . Firishchak, 468
F.3d 1015, 1026 (7th Cir. 2006) (concluding that defendants in civ il denaturalization
proceedings are not entitled to a jury trial)).
22 See 7 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 96.13
(Matthew Bender & Co. ed., rev . ed. 2018) (“The immediate effect of denaturalization, of
course, is to div est the naturalized persons of their status as U.S. citizens, to restore them
to the former status of alienage, and to make them amenable to the consequences of such
alien status.”).
23 5 id. § 64.03 (discussingremov al procedure).
24 INA § 340(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).
25 Id.
26 INA § 340(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1451(d).
27 Ev en birthright citizenship, howev er, is currently under challenge. See Ediberto
Román & Ernesto Sagás, Birthright Citizenship Under Attack: How Dominican Nationality
Laws May Be the Future of U.S. Exclusion, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1383, 1385 (2017) (“Trump
promised that, if elected, his administration would ‘[e]nd birthright citizenship.’” (quoting
DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, IMMIGRATION REFORM THAT WILL MAKE AMERICA
GREAT AGAIN, https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/Immigration-Reform-Trump.pdf (last
v isited Dec. 30, 2018))).
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stem, and there are no rights to be protected independently by
guardian ad litem.”28
A. Recent Trends Shaping Current Denaturalization Policy
The current growth of denaturalization as a policy tool results
from the intersection of sev eral recent trends. The first is the shrinking
cost of computingpower: It is now much easier to digitize records and
to use software tools to analyze hundreds of thousands of records at
once.29 And the impetus to do so took root in the Obama administration, which asserted a national security interest in ex aminingpotential
cases of immigration fraud that could potentially be tied to terrorist
threats. Ov erall, the Obama years saw a significant increase in immigration enforcement.30
After President Trump took office in January 2017, the gov ernment adopted a so-called zero-tolerance immigration policy, pledging
enforcement against anyone who had broken immigration laws whom
authorities encountered, without regard to mitigating factors.31 Of
course, there are simply too many immigrants and potential immigrants to enforce all of the immigration laws all of the time, so what
the zero-tolerance policy means in practice is that sanctions will be
applied in an unpredictable and arbitrary manner—a potential v iolation of due process.32 Unlike in the past, there would be no tolerance
28

United States ex rel. Harrington v . Schlotfeldt, 136 F.2d 935, 939–40 (7th Cir. 1943).
See Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735, 1758 (2015)
(“[T]ransaction costs for the collection and analysis of data hav e rapidly decreased.
Therefore, economic restraints on inv estigatory and administrativ e capacity to impose
consequences are rapidly decreasingas well . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
30 See Elliott Young, Felons and Families, UNC PRESS BLOG (Apr. 3, 2017, 9:00 AM),
https://uncpressblog.com/2017/04/03/elliott-young-felons-and-families (“Trump’s
immigration policies . . . merely accelerate the criminalization of immigrants that was in full
swingunder Obama.”).
31 See Bill Ong Hing, Entering the Trump ICE Age: Contextualizing the New
Immigration Enforcement Regime, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 253, 315–16 (2018) (“Although
the likelihood of an ICE encounter may still be small, immigration enforcement since the
election of President Trump is up. ICE is following the new enforcement priorities and
makingcollateral arrests alongthe way.” (footnote omitted)); see also Lorelei Laird, ABA
Works to Meet Immigrants’ Increased Need for Legal Assistance and Oppose Family
Separations, A.B.A. J. MAG. (Aug. 2018), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
immigrants_legal_assistance_family_separations (ex plaininghow the adoption of the zerotolerance policy has resulted in a greater need for legal serv ices).
32 See infra Sections I.A.1, I.A.2; see also Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v . Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 584 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he protection of the indiv idual against
arbitrary action . . . [is] the v ery essence of due process . . . .” (alteration in original)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Timothy Sandefur, In Defense of
Substantive Due Process, or the Promise of Lawful Rule, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283,
292 (2012) (“An arbitrary act has either no reasons to ex plain it or only reasons that would
with equal plausibility justify the opposite act.”).
29
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for small infractions. Activ ities that might hav e been tolerated under a
doctrine of prosecutorial discretion could now be subject to immediate sanction—but no one could predict when and on whom those
sanctions would fall.
1. Newly Digitized Data and Operation Janus
Janus was the two-faced Roman god of “beginnings and transitions,” looking simultaneously into the past and the future.33 The
Department of Homeland Security’s “Operation Janus” similarly
looks back ov er the files of naturalized citizens, ex aminingthe historical record to see whether ev idence ov erlooked in the past could support filing a future denaturalization proceeding.34 The effort focuses
on indiv iduals from “special interest countries,” related to nationalsecurity priorities.35
The program began under the Obama administration in 2009,
when the U.S. Customs and Border Protection identified 206 indiv iduals “who had receiv ed final deportation orders and subsequently
used a different biographic identity, such as a name and date of birth,
to obtain an immigration benefit (e.g., legal permanent resident status
or citizenship).”36 Further inquiry rev ealed another 1029 cases of indiv iduals with prev iously ov erlooked deportation orders who had nonetheless been granted citizenship, 858 of whom did not hav e digital
fingerprints on file.37 As a result, the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Serv ices (USCIS), led by ICE, began a concerted effort
41254-nyu_94-3 Sheet No. 50 Side B
05/14/2019 08:58:42

33 John Patrick Clayton, Note, The Two Faces of Janus: The Jurisprudential Past and
New Beginning of Rule 10b-5, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 853, 854 (2014) (citing EDITH
HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY 51 (1998)).
34 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-16-130,
POTENTIALLY INELIGIBLE INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN GRANTED U.S. CITIZENSHIP
BECAUSE OF INCOMPLETE FINGERPRINT RECORDS (2016) [hereinafter OIG], https://
www.oig.dhs.gov /sites/default/files/assets/Mgmt/2016/OIG-16-130-Sep16.pdf.
35 Id. at 1 n.2 (“Special interest countries are generally defined as countries that are of
concern to the national security of the United States, based on sev eral U.S. Gov ernment
reports.”); see also Cato, Coming to America: The Weaponization of Immigration, 46
WASHBURN L.J. 309, 326 (2007) (describing“thirty-fiv e nations designated by the United
States Department of Homeland Security as ‘special interest’ countries . . . so labeled
because American intelligence identifies them as likely ex porters of terrorism”).
36 OIG, supra note 34, at 1.
37 Id. These numbers represent a v ery small fraction of the foreign-born population in
the United States. See Jie Zonget al., Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and
Immigration in the United States, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Feb. 8, 2018), https://
www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-andimmigration-united-states (reporting that 1.49 million foreign-born indiv iduals mov ed to
the United States in 2016 alone).
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to digitize and upload decades-old fingerprint records and to match
those records with immigration files.38
In 2016, the Office of the Inspector General reported that ICE
had identified 315,000 indiv iduals with deportation orders or criminal
histories whose files were missing fingerprint records, and ICE had
“not yet rev iewed about 148,000 aliens’ files to try to retriev e and digitize the old fingerprint cards.”39 That process is now ongoing, and the
agency has sought funds to ex pand it: ICE’s 2019 budget request seeks
funds to rev iew another 700,000 files—all with the purpose of seeking
potential deportation or denaturalization.40
As of August 2018, the Department of Justice had announced the
filingof sev en actions arisingfrom Operation Janus.41 Three of those
are criminal actions for fraud in the immigration process. Two of those
cases ended with a plea agreement that includes denaturalization and
a prison term, and one ended in a jury conv iction.42 An additional
four cases were filed as civ il actions seekingdenaturalization. Of the
38

OIG, supra note 34, at 4.
Id. at 2–4.
40 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, OPERATIONS &
SUPPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2019 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 21, https://www.
dhs.gov /sites/default/files/publications/U.S.%20Immigration%20and%20Customs%20
Enforcement.pdf.
41 The sev en cases at present are in different stages of litigation. Criminal proceedings
against Enite Alindor a/k/a Odette Dureland hav e resulted in a jury conv iction and
denaturalization. United States v . Alindor, No. 8:17-CR-270-T-33MAP, 2018 WL 1705647
(M.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2018). A guilty plea resultingin denaturalization has been entered by
Munia Parv in a/k/a Zarrin Hoque. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Woman Sentenced
and Denaturalized for Obtaining U.S. Citizenship by Lying to Officials (Dec. 13, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov /usao-mdfl/pr/woman-sentenced-and-denaturalized-obtaining-uscitizenship-lying-officials [hereinafter Parv in Press Release]. A guilty plea resulting in
denaturalization has also been entered by Natasha Pierre, a/k/a Elsie Petitfrere. Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Second Woman Sentenced and Denaturalized for Obtaining
U.S. Citizenship Through Lies (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov /usao-mdfl/
pr/second-woman-sentenced-and-denaturalized-obtaining-us-citizenship-through-lies
[hereinafter Petitfrere Press Release]. A complaint has been filed against Humayun Kabir
Rahaman, f/k/a Md Humayun Kabir Talukder. Complaint, United States v . Rahan, No.
CV-10530 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 14, 2018). The United States was unopposed by Baljinder
Singh and thus was granted a summary judgment for denaturalization. United States v .
Singh, No. CV 17-7214 (SRC), 2018 WL 305325 (D.N.J. Jan. 5, 2018). A complaint has
been filed against Parav ez Manzoor Khan, a/k/a Mohammad Akhtar. Complaint, United
States v . Khan, No. 3:17-CV-96S-J-32PDB (M.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2017). A complaint has also
been filed against Rashid Mahmood a/k/a Rashid Mehmood. Complaint, United States v .
Mahmood, No. 3:17-cv -01562 (D. Conn. Sept. 19, 2017); see also Matthew Hoppock,
Operation Janus and Operation Second Look: Denaturalization of Citizens with Removal
Orders, HOPPOCK L. FIRM (Mar. 4, 2018), https://www.hoppocklawfirm.com/operationjanus-operation-second-look-denaturalization-citizens-remov al-orders (discussing recent
denaturalization cases).
42 United States v . Alindor, No. 8:17-CR-270-T-33MAP, 2018 WL 1705647 (M.D. Fla.
Apr. 9, 2018); Parv in Press Release, supra note 41; Petitfrere Press Release, supra note 41.
39
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civ il actions filed, only the first has been concluded; it resulted in a
summary judgment of denaturalization.43 Immigration law ex perts
ex pect a number of additional cases to be filed in the near future.44
2. Zero Tolerance
In one of his major campaign speeches in September 2016, thencandidate Donald Trump announced that if he is elected “all immigration laws will be enforced . . . [and] no one will be immune or ex empt
from enforcement . . . . Anyone who has entered the United States
illegally is subject to deportation—that is what it means to hav e laws
and to hav e a country.”45 Because of the significant number of indiv iduals who hav e entered the United States illegally, it is essentially
impossible to pursue all deportable indiv iduals. The result is arbitrary
and unpredictable enforcement. In some cases, indiv iduals on the path
to naturalization are trapped at the v ery moment they believ ed their
legal situation was to be resolv ed:
As the Trump administration arrests thousands of immigrants with
no criminal history and reshapes the prospects of ev en legal immigrants . . . many who hav e liv ed without papers for years are
urgently seeking legal status by way of a parent, adult child or
spouse who is already a citizen or permanent resident. In a growing
number of cases, howev er, immigrants with old deportation orders
that were nev er enforced are gettingthe go-ahead after an interv iew
by United States Citizenship and Immigration Serv ices, the agency
that handles residency and citizenship, only to be arrested by ICE.46

05/14/2019 08:58:42

43 Complaint, United States v . Rahan, No. CV-10530 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 14, 2018);
United States v . Singh, No. CV 17-7214 (SRC), 2018 WL 305325 (D.N.J. Jan. 5, 2018);
Complaint, United States v . Khan, No. 3:17-CV-96S-J-32PDB (M.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2017);
Complaint, United States v . Mahmood, No. 3:17-cv -01562 (D. Conn. Sept. 19, 2017); see
infra Section I.B.
44 See, e.g., Matthew Hoppock, Three Operation Janus Updates in the Pending Cases in
Federal Court, HOPPOCK L. FIRM (May 15, 2018), https://www.hoppocklawfirm.com/threeoperation-janus-updates-in-the-pending-cases-in-federal-court (“We anticipate the DOJ
will be filing more of these cases shortly, especially if they can get these cases granted
without hav ingto fight v ery hard.”).
45 Donald J. Trump, Transcript of Donald Trump’s Immigration Speech (Aug. 31, 2016),
in N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/02/us/politics/transcripttrump-immigration-speech.html.
46 Viv ian Yee, A Marriage Used to Prevent Deportation. Not Anymore., N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/19/us/immigration-marriage-greencard.html.
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Internal emails uncov ered by the American Civ il Liberties Union
hav e rev ealed coordination between USCIS and ICE to apprehend
undocumented immigrant spouses of U.S. citizens when the spouses
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reported to interv iews in an attempt to obtain legal status.47 Tactics
used included spreading out or delaying interv iews to giv e ICE the
opportunity to arrest indiv iduals.48
Poignant media reports hav e featured indiv iduals deported after
serv ingin the U.S. military, surprisingmany who believ ed such serv ice
to be a shield against such actions.49 Military spouses are suffering
similar fates, and families are ripped apart ev en when there was no
criminal behav ior or anythingelse that raised obv ious problems.50
One of the most disconcertingtrends inv olv es the deportation or
threatened deportation of indiv iduals who acted legally or in reasonable reliance on prev ious actions by the gov ernment. For ex ample, the
Trump Administration is currently locked in a battle with the courts
ov er the fate of the Obama-era Deferred Action for Childhood
Arriv als (DACA) program, which seeks to protect from deportation
youngindiv iduals who came to the United States as children.51 A federal district court judge recently ruled that the Administration is obligated to restore the program.52 In addition, while the law has
historically permitted authorities to reject immigration applications if
the applicant is considered likely to become a “public charge,” White
House adv isor Stephen Miller has proposed changing the gov ern-
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47 See Sonia Moghe & Dav id Shortell, ACLU: Officials Set Up ‘Trap’ to Arrest
Immigrants at Legal Status Interviews, CNN (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/
14/politics/ice-immigrants-trap-lawsuit-aclu/index .html (describing coordination between
the Boston area USCIS office and local ICE officers).
48 See id.
49 See, e.g., Kristine Phillips, The Story Behind This Powerful Photo of Deported
Military Veterans Saluting the U.S. Flag, WASH. POST (Nov . 16, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/11/16/the-story-behind-this-powerfulphoto-of-deported-military-v eterans-saluting-the-american-flag (describing a group of
about two dozen deported American military v eterans who gather in Juarez, Mex ico).
50 See, e.g., Associated Press, ‘It’s an Absolute Disgrace’: Tears and Anger as Wife of US
Marine Deported to Mexico, GUARDIAN (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2018/aug/03/us-marine-wife-alejandra-juarez-deported-mex ico; Tara Copp, As Many
as 11,800 Military Families Face Deportation Issues, Group Says, MILITARY TIMES (Apr. 1,
2018), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2018/04/01/as-many-as-11800military-families-face-deportation-issues-group-says (reporting that up to 11,800 people
serv ingin the U.S. military may hav e spouses or family members facingdeportation); Tara
Copp, More Military Families Come Forward with Deportation Fears, MILITARY TIMES
(Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2018/03/04/moremilitary-families-come-forward-with-deportation-fears (noting that sev eral people had
come forward with stories of military spouses who were in deportation proceedings); see
also Fact Sheet on Denaturalization, NAT’L IMMIGR. F. (Oct. 2, 2018), https://
immigrationforum.org/article/fact-sheet-on-denaturalization (discussing the potential
effects of denaturalization on spouses).
51 MARIA PIMIENTA & ANN MORSE, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS (2018), www.ncsl.org/research/
immigration/deferred-action.aspx (ex plainingDACA).
52 See NAACP v . Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 457, 474 (D.D.C. 2018).
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ment’s interpretation of “public charge” to make legal immigrants’
past use of many gov ernment benefits a barrier to permanent residency or citizenship.53
B. The Two Trends Converge in Current Litigation
Both of these trends—lookingback at old cases with the help of
newly digitized data and increasing enforcement without regard to
mitigatingfactors—hav e conv erged in denaturalization cases, creating
a credible fear that ev en long-ago mistakes can unrav el current citizenship rights. Operation Janus has led to the filing of sev eral civ il
denaturalization cases, includingthe first case to reach judgment: that
of Baljinder Singh, who sought asylum in the United States as a teenager in the early 1990s, and obtained citizenship in 2006.54 Singh has
no reported criminal history. Similarly, the zero-tolerance approach
resulted in the gov ernment seekingto denaturalize Norma Borgoño, a
six ty-three-year-old grandmother who was, in the gov ernment’s
words, a “minimal participant”55 in her former boss’s fraud but who
helped the FBI build the case against him.56 Without the zerotolerance policy, the gov ernment likely would hav e ex ercised
prosecutorial discretion and not sought her denaturalization. Under
current policy, howev er, the gov ernment filed civ il denaturalization
actions against both Singh and Borgoño.
1. Baljinder Singh: Newly Digitized Data

05/14/2019 08:58:42

53 Tal Kopan, Sources: Stephen Miller Pushing Policy to Make It Harder for Immigrants
Who Received Benefits to Earn Citizenship, CNN (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/
2018/08/07/politics/stephen-miller-immigrants-penalize-benefits/index .html.
54 See infra Section I.B.1.
55 Plea Offer at 4, United States v . Borgoño, No. 1:18-cv -21835 (S.D. Fla. Nov . 2, 2011),
https://www.justice.gov /opa/press-release/file/1060901/download.
56 See infra Section I.B.2.
57 Complaint, United States v . Singh, No. 2:17-cv -07214 (D.N.J. Sept. 19, 2017).
58 Id. at 4.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 6.
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Baljinder Singh had immigrated to the United States as a fifteenor six teen-year-old in 1991.57 In February of 1992, he filed an application for political asylum.58 Nearly fiv e years later, while his asylum
application was still pending, Singh married a U.S. citizen and applied
for an adjustment of status.59 In 1998, he was granted lawful permanent resident status.60 In 2006, Singh took the Oath of Allegiance to
the United States and became a naturalized citizen.61
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62 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, United States Files
Denaturalization Complaints in Florida, Connecticut and New Jersey Against Three
Indiv iduals Who Fraudulently Naturalized After Hav ingBeen Ordered Deported Under
Different Identities (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.justice.gov /opa/pr/united-states-filesdenaturalization-complaints-florida-connecticut-and-new-jersey-against.
63 Complaint at 2, United States v . Singh, No. CV 17-7214 (SRC), 2018 WL 305325
(D.N.J. Jan. 5, 2018).
64 Id. at 3.
65 United States v . Singh, No. CV 17-7214 (SRC), 2018 WL 305325, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 5,
2018).
66 Complaint, supra note 57, at 4.
67 Singh, 2018 WL 305325, at *1.
68 Complaint, supra note 57, at 2–3.
69 Id. at 3.
70 See generally OIG, supra note 34.
71 Singh, 2018 WL 305325, at *1 n.1.
72 Id.
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Twelv e years later, Singh’s file was rev iewed as part of Operation
Janus.62 The gov ernment alleged that Singh had originally entered the
United States under the name Dav inder Singh and had filed an earlier
proceedingunder that name.63 He had allegedly arriv ed in the United
States on a flight from Hong Kong in September 1991 as a teenager
trav eling without a passport or any other identification papers.64 A
Punjabi interpreter wrote his name down as “Dav inder Singh.”65 He
was fingerprinted and detained for nearly two weeks, then released on
bond to stay with a friend in October of that year.66 Three weeks after
his release, notice of an upcomingimmigration hearingwas mailed to
his friend’s house. When he failed to show up for the hearing in
January of 1992, the court ordered him deported in absentia.67
At nearly the same time, howev er, a parallel case was goingforward in another courtroom: An asylum action for “Baljinder Singh”
was filed on February 6, 1992, less than a month after “Dav inder” had
failed to show up for the hearing in the other case.68 That case was
nev er dismissed on the merits; instead, it remained pendingfor more
than four years until Baljinder Singh married a U.S. citizen and
obtained adjustment of his immigration status to lawful permanent
resident, and later obtained naturalization.69
It was not until Operation Janus was able to digitize the old fingerprint cards and use electronic resources to analyze them that the
two cases were ev er connected.70 The Justice Department compared
“a January 24, 1992 fingerprint card bearingthe name Baljinder Singh
to a September 25, 1991 fingerprint card bearingthe name Dav inder
Singh.”71 The inv estigation concluded that “[b]ased on a comparativ e
analysis of the friction ridge details of each fingerprint . . . the fingerprints match and belongto the same indiv idual.”72
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In September 2017, the ActingU.S. Attorney for the District of
New Jersey filed a civ il denaturalization complaint against Singh. In its
complaint, the gov ernment alleged that Singh had procured naturalization by fraud or willful misrepresentation and it sought to rev oke his
citizenship.73
Singh did not file an answer or appear in the lawsuit, and there is
no record of an attorney representing him in the case. As a result,
when the gov ernment mov ed for summary judgment, it was unopposed.74 The district court consequently held that “[b]y failing [to]
respond to the complaint, Defendant has defaulted and thus is
‘deemed to hav e admitted the factual allegations of the Complaint by
v irtue of [his] default.’ ”75 Takingthe gov ernment’s allegations as true,
and noting that there had been no ev idence “to impeach the credibility of this scientific fingerprint analysis,”76 the court concluded that
Singh had “procured his naturalization as a result of these misrepresentations and concealments.”77 The court granted summary judgment
in fav or of the gov ernment, ruling that Singh would be
denaturalized.78
Of course, we do not know why Singh did not answer the lawsuit.
The agent who serv ed process did not serv e him personally—instead,
the summons and complaint were left with someone else—a person of
“suitable age and discretion” who liv ed at his last known address.79 As
a result, it is possible that he did not learn of the lawsuit in time to
defend it. And it is possible that ev en now he does not know that he
has lost his citizenship and therefore might hav e to wait until he tries

05/14/2019 08:58:42

Id. at *4.
Id. at *2.
75 Id. at *1 n.2 (quotingDoe v . Simone, 2013 WL 3772532, at *2 (D.N.J. July 17, 2013)).
76 Id. at *1 n.1.
77 Id. at *6.
78 Id.
79 See Process Receipt and Return, United States v . Singh, No 2:17-cv -07214-SRC (on
file with authors) (showingthat serv ice was made upon one Pritam Singh); FED. R. CIV. P.
4(e)(2)(B) (allowing serv ice of process on a “person of suitable age and discretion” who
shares a residence with the defendant). The shared last name of “Singh,” howev er, does
not necessarily suggest a familial relation. Baptized Sikh males take the name Singh, most
commonly as their last name. See Common Sikh Names Banned Under Canada’s
Immigration Policy, CBC (July 23, 2007), https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/
common-sikh-names-banned-under-canada-s-immigration-policy-1.689259 (discussing the
use of Singh as a last name in Sikh tradition). In addition, the city of Carteret, where
Baljinder Singh was last known to liv e, has the largest Sikh community in the state of New
Jersey. Kev in Coyne, Turbans Make Targets, Some Sikhs Find, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/15/nyregion/nyregionspecial2/15colnj.html (stating that
in 2008, New Jersey had a population of 25,000 Sikhs and Carteret was “home to the
largest concentration of Sikhs in the state”).
74
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80 Sonia Smith, The Long Road to Asylum, TEX. MONTHLY (Aug. 25, 2014), https://
www.tex asmonthly.com/politics/the-long-road-to-asylum.
81 Singh v . I.N.S., 292 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2002).
82 Id.
83 Id.
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to trav el on a passport or v ote in a federal election to find out that he
is no longer a citizen of the United States.
Assumingthe gov ernment properly matched the fingerprint cards
and Baljinder and Dav inder Singh are indeed the same person, we do
not know why he failed to show up to the first asylum hearing, or why
a second case was filed under a different name. The gov ernment, of
course, claims that this was intentional fraud—a person usingtwo different names to gain an unfair adv antage. But this is not a case where
someone lost an asylum case on the merits before re-filing under a
new name. There appears to be substantially more risk than benefit to
Singh from filing two different asylum proceedings under two different names.
It is possible that the Punjabi translator simply made a mistake in
originally recordinghis name as “Dav inder” rather than “Baljinder.”
Competent Punjabi translators can be difficult to find: A lawyer for
Gurbinder Singh, a later asylum seeker in Tex as, reported that “the
only translator he had been able to find in the general area was an
Albuquerque-based cab driv er who ha[d] only conv ersational Punjabi
skills and couldn’t communicate at the lev el . . . needed to fill out his
clients’ asylum claims in detail.”80 One Sikh asylum seeker,
Monhinder Singh, obtained rev ersal of his asylum denial as a result of
translation problems.81 Mohinder Singh arriv ed in New York, and was
interv iewed by a translator who spoke Hindi, rather than Punjabi.82
The Ninth Circuit concluded that inconsistencies in his answers could
well hav e arisen from the difficulties in communication, stating that
“Singh was twice remov ed from understanding the immigration
officer’s questions and completely precluded from ensuring that his
responses were accurately conv eyed to the officer and duly recorded.
The English-Hindi-Punjabi-Hindi-English round robin that occurred
there begins to take on the patina of the children’s game of
‘telephone.’ ”83
Perhaps a poorly prepared translator misunderstood Baljinder
Singh’s first name. Singh had entered the country in California, and a
California lawyer filed the initial case on his behalf and mov ed to hav e
the case transferred to New Jersey. Singh’s entire time in California
was spent in immigration detention. Giv en his lack of English fluency,
it is not clear that he would hav e understood the nature of the proceedings. When Singh was released to friends in New Jersey, the
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California lawyers were no longer a part of the case. Perhaps when
Singh or his newly appointed lawyer contacted the court in New
Jersey, they were told that there was no filingunder his name. If so,
this could prov ide an innocuous ex planation for why he sought to file
a second asylum proceedingless than a month after failingto show up
for the first.
But without the defendant present (either in person or through
an attorney), we are left to guess. Apparently nothing in the second
proceeding led the gov ernment to be concerned about Singh’s background or moral character, and nothingin the recent denaturalization
petition suggests any later history of criminal activ ity. But twenty
years after he was granted lawful permanent resident status, and more
than ten years after becoming a U.S. citizen, Baljinder Singh was
stripped of that citizenship—without the aid of an attorney and
without the effectiv e chance to contest the allegations against him.
2. Norma Borgoño: Zero Tolerance and Collateral Consequences
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84 Mazzei, supra note 16; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department
Seeks to Rev oke Citizenship of Conv icted Felons Who Conspired to Defraud U.S. Ex portImport Bank of More than $24 Million (May 8, 2018), https://www.justice.gov /opa/pr/
justice-department-seeks-rev oke-citizenship-conv icted-felons-who-conspired-defraud-usex port.
85 Adiel Kaplan, Miami Grandma Targeted as U.S. Takes Aim at Naturalized
Immigrants with Prior Offenses, MIAMI HERALD (July 9, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.
com/news/local/immigration/article214173489.html; Affidav it of Dav id Jansen at 2, para. 6,
United States v . Borgoño, No. 1:18-cv -21835 (S.D. Fla. Nov . 2, 2011), https://
www.justice.gov /opa/press-release/file/1060901/download.
86 Complaint to Rev oke Naturalization at 2–3, para. 7, United States v . Borgoño, No.
1:18-cv -21835 (S.D. Fla. May 5, 2018), https://www.justice.gov /opa/press-release/file/
1060906/download.
87 United States v . Borgoño, No. 1:18-cv -21835 (S.D. Fla. Nov . 2, 2011), https://www.
justice.gov /opa/press-release/file/1060901/download.
88 Plea Offer at 3, 5, United States v . Borgoño, No. 1:18-cv -21835 (S.D. Fla. Nov . 8,
2011), https://www.justice.gov /opa/press-release/file/1060901/download.
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Norma Borgoño, a six ty-three-year-old grandmother who suffers
from a rare kidney disease, is one of the indiv iduals targeted for
denaturalization based on criminal activ ity.84 Borgoño legally immigrated to the United States in 1989 and obtained U.S. citizenship in
2007.85 Between 2003 and 2009, Borgoño worked as an office manager
for Tex on, owned by Guillermo Oscar Mondino.86 During this time,
Mondino was orchestrating a fraudulent plan to obtain loan guarantees from the Ex port-Import Bank of the United States, the gov ernment’s official ex port credit agency.87 When the FBI inv estigated the
fraud, Borgoño prov ided assistance.88 Mondino pleaded guilty to

41254-nyu_94-3 Sheet No. 55 Side A

05/14/2019 08:58:42

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\94-3\NYU303.tx t

June 2019]

unknown

Seq: 18

(UN)CIVIL DENATURALIZATION

14-MAY-19

8:49

419

05/14/2019 08:58:42

89 Judgment in a Criminal Case 2–4, United States v . Mondino, No. 1:18-cv -21841
(D.D.C. Nov . 1, 2011), https://www.justice.gov /opa/press-release/file/1060916/download.
90 Information at 3, United States v . Borgoño, No. 1:18-cv -21835 (S.D. Fla. Nov . 2,
2011), https://www.justice.gov /opa/press-release/file/1060901/download.
91 deGooyer, supra note 8 (“She immigrated legally, suffers from a rare kidney disease,
and ev en cooperated with the FBI when they inv estigated the crime. Still, after liv ingand
workingfor decades in the United States, she is facingdeportation.”).
92 Plea Offer, supra note 88, at 4.
93 Id. at 5.
94 Kaplan, supra note 85.
95 Information, supra note 90, at 4.
96 Kaplan, supra note 85.
97 Complaint, supra note 86, at 16, para. 81.
98 Id. at 9–12.
99 Jordan v . De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951) (“The phrase ‘crime inv olv ingmoral
turpitude’ has without ex ception been construed to embrace fraudulent conduct. We
therefore decide that Congress sufficiently forewarned respondent that the statutory
consequence of twice conspiring to defraud the United States is deportation.”); see also
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fraud and money laundering, was sentenced to nearly four years in
prison, and was ordered to pay more than $13 million in restitution.89
Borgoño, as office manager, prepared paperwork that her boss
used in the fraudulent transactions.90 When the FBI inv estigated the
case, she prov ided assistance that helped to incriminate Mondino.91
Because she allegedly knew that her boss’s actions were fraudulent at
the time that she helped to prepare the paperwork for the deals, she
was charged with conspiracy—though the Justice Department
acknowledged that she was a “minimal participant.”92 Rather than
stand trial, Borgoño accepted a plea deal that gav e her fiv e years of
probation and required her to pay $5000 in restitution.93 Borgoño did
not share in the millions of dollars fraudulently paid out.94 At most,
less than $2000 was paid to Borgoño’s account.95 While on probation,
she worked a second job and paid the ordered restitution in full.96
The gov ernment’s denaturalization petition seeks to rev oke
Borgoño’s citizenship on the grounds that Borgoño lacked the requisite good moral character to qualify for naturalization. It alleges that
she lied in her citizenship application by falsely answering“no” on the
naturalization application when it asked whether she had “knowingly
committed any crime . . . for which she had not been arrested.”97 It
further alleges that Borgoño’s conspiracy conv iction was a “fraud
related offense” that “statutorily precluded” her from establishing
good moral character under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3), which prov ides that
an applicant conv icted of a crime of moral turpitude cannot establish
good moral character.98
Borgoño’s case is still pending, and the gov ernment may well lose
on the merits. Fraud claims are categorically considered crimes of
moral turpitude when ev aluated in the immigration process.99

41254-nyu_94-3 Sheet No. 55 Side B

05/14/2019 08:58:42

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\94-3\NYU303.tx t

420

unknown

Seq: 19

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

14-MAY-19

8:49

[Vol. 94:402

Borgoño was a citizen at the time of conv iction, and it is not clear that
the categorical approach would or should be applied to retroactiv ely
question her fitness for citizenship.100 But in any case, the loss of citizenship is a troublingly harsh sanction for what appears to be relativ ely minor misconduct. Borgoño neither orchestrated the scheme
nor personally benefitted from it. She prov ided office support to a
boss engaged in financial crime, and her only personal benefit was
being allowed to keep her job—a job that may well hav e prov ided
life-sav ing health insurance benefits that allowed her to seek treatment for her kidney disorder.101 Ev en if her crime was legally one of
moral turpitude, it was not one condemned by society at large; the
facts of her case aroused significant sympathy from the public.102
The incentiv es inherent in modern plea bargaining also suggest
another possible injustice: Borgoño may hav e been factually innocent
of the crime she pleaded guilty to.103 Because she pleaded guilty, the
gov ernment did not need to prov e that Borgoño understood that the
paperwork she prepared for her boss was beingused in a fraudulent
transaction or that she had the intent to assist in his fraud. Perhaps she
did hav e the requisite mens rea. But whether she did or not, her sentence of probation and minimal restitution was not onerous, and
Borgoño may well hav e judged that it was not worth the ex pense and
risk of goingto trial.104 Ev en if factually innocent, she may hav e wor-
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Shannon M. Grammel, Note, Chev ron Meets the Categorical Approach, 70 STAN. L. REV.
921, 934–35 (2018) (ex plaining the categorical approach, a two-step process for
determiningwhether certain offenses fit within the federal definition of a larger category
of crimes).
100 Lopez Ventura v . Sessions, 907 F.3d 306, 313 (5th Cir. 2018) (notingthat “[t]hough
the categorical approach is longstanding, it is not absolute”). But see United States v .
Marcu, 210 F. Supp. 3d 1234, 1241 (D. Nev . 2016) (applyingthe categorical approach ev en
in a denaturalization case).
101 See Kaplan, supra note 85 (notingthat Borgoño’s close family members in Peru had
died of the same kidney disease for which she is now beingtreated).
102 See Amanda Marcotte, Donald Trump’s Immigration Policy: Define All Latino
Immigrants as “Criminals,” Then Deport Them, SALON (July 10, 2018), https://
www.salon.com/2018/07/10/donald-trumps-immigration-policy-define-all-latinoimmigrants-as-criminals-then-deport-them (“If the administration manages to get Borgoño
denaturalized ov er a minor offense for which she has made full amends, it will continue
twistingthe definition to figure out how far they [sic] can go.”).
103 A new report notes that this is not an infrequent occurrence. NAT’L ASS’N OF
CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW TO SAVE IT (2018), https://
www.nacdl.org/trialpenaltyreport (“There is ample ev idence that federal criminal
defendants are being coerced to plead guilty because the penalty for ex ercising their
constitutional rights is simply too high a risk.”).
104 Erica Hashimoto, Toward Ethical Plea Bargaining, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 949, 951
(2008) (“Innocent defendants often hav e less information about the case against them than
guilty defendants and therefore cannot accurately ev aluate the strength of the case against
them.”); Samuel R. Wiseman, Waiving Innocence, 96 MINN. L. REV. 952, 960–61 (2012)
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ried about the possibility of a wrongful conv iction. And she may also
hav e not been sure of either her legal guilt or innocence. For ex ample,
she may hav e struggled to remember ex actly what she knew at the
time that she completed her boss’s paperwork—did she know her boss
was committing fraud, or did she merely suspect it? Certainly, once
the FBI approached her, she assisted in the inv estigation. But she
likely would not hav e been able to ev aluate her own potential liability,
and it is not uncommon that a defendant “later may well question her
own judgment and the reasonableness of her belief.”105
Of course, that calculation only makes sense if Borgoño did not
understand the potential collateral consequences of her plea—that
pleadingguilty could cause her citizenship to be stripped and create a
risk that she could be deported to a country where she no longer has
any family or personal connections. Indeed, she says now that she had
no idea that denaturalization could be a potential consequence. If so,
she may be able to challenge the underlyingconv iction and with it, the
gov ernment’s denaturalization petition. The Supreme Court held in
Padilla v. Kentucky that attorneys prov ide ineffectiv e assistance of
counsel if they fail to inform clients that their plea “carries a risk of
deportation.”106 Denaturalization both encompasses the risk of deportation and strips away the defendant’s membership in the national
political community.107 Under the logic of Padilla, a defendant who
pleads guilty without beingtold of the risk of losingcitizenship should
be able to challenge that conv iction.108
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(“Despite stubborn perceptions to the contrary, innocent defendants plead guilty. Eight
percent of the wrongfully conv icted defendants ex onerated by DNA initially entered guilty
pleas, and the strongincentiv es that push some innocent defendants to plead guilty remain,
suggestingthat this trend may continue.”).
105 Kev in C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 957, 980 (1989) (noting that such problems can arise especially “under
ambiguous circumstances,” where liability depends on the reasonableness of the
defendant’s actions).
106 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010).
107 See Trop v . Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101–02 (1958) (Warren, C.J., plurality opinion)
(noting that denaturalization remov es the defendant from the “national . . . political
community” and that “his enjoyment of ev en the limited rights of an alien might be subject
to termination at any time by reason of deportation”).
108 Some courts hav e suggested that Padilla’s requirement to warn of potential
deportation could apply in the denaturalization contex t. See Lee v . United States, 137 S.
Ct. 1958, 1966 (2017) (v acating a defendant’s deportation conv iction because he
demonstrated prejudice due to ineffectiv e assistance of counsel but reaffirmingthat finding
prejudice resulting from ineffectiv e assistance requires a case-by-case determination);
United States v . Ataya, 884 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 2018) (rev ersing a defendant’s fraud
conv iction because he was not properly informed of his plea’s potential denaturalization
consequences and he demonstrated that he would not hav e taken the plea otherwise);
United States v . Marcu, 210 F. Supp. 3d 1234, 1241 (D. Nev . 2016) (refusingto estop the
gov ernment from pursuingdenaturalization after prosecutors had represented to the court
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II
DENATURALIZATION POLICY

How do the Singh and Borgoño cases fit within the United States’
denaturalization policy? In short, they seem to reflect a throwback
approach that does not fit into present-day denaturalization policy at
all—and that is one of the reasons that the cases hav e caused such a
public outcry.109 Denaturalization was relativ ely common in the first
half of the twentieth century, with ov er 22,000 Americans losingtheir
citizenship between 1907 and 1967.110 But it rapidly fell out of fav or in
the second half of the twentieth century.111 Between 1968 and 2013,
fewer than 150 Americans were denaturalized.112 As a result, one
scholar concluded in 2013 that “denaturalization has largely become a
thing of the past,” primarily reserv ed for people who “camouflaged
crimes against humanity prior to their immigration.”113
The decline in denaturalization coincided with a series of
Supreme Court cases protectiv e of citizenship rights.114 Those cases
made it more difficult for the gov ernment to strip indiv iduals of their
citizenship. But they alone were not the driv ingforce in denaturalization’s wane in the mid-to-late twentieth century; the decline of the
Red Scare and an increasingemphasis on civ il rights played an equal
or greater role.
A. The Origin of Denaturalization Authority

05/14/2019 08:58:42

that the defendant was a citizen and therefore not subject to deportation, and notingthat
“it is the Defendant’s counsel’s duty, not the gov ernment’s, to inform him of deportation
consequences”).
109 Mazzei, supra note 16 (“The renewed focus on denaturalization, and a recent uptick
in the number of cases filed by the Justice Department, hav e deeply unsettled many
immigrants who had longbeliev ed that a United States passport warded off a lifetime of
anx iety ov er possible deportation.”).
110 PATRICK WEIL, THE SOVEREIGN CITIZEN: DENATURALIZATION AND THE ORIGINS
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 179 (2013).
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 180.
114 See infra Part III.
115 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“The Congress shall hav e Power . . . ; To establish an
uniform Rule of Naturalization.”).
116 For a description of the history of congressional legislation in this area, see Aram A.
Gav oor & Daniel Miktus, Snap: How the Moral Elasticity of the Denaturalization Statute
Goes Too Far, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 637, 649–53 (2015).
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Denaturalization is nev er mentioned in the Constitution. Naturalization, on the other hand, is a power ex plicitly constitutionally giv en
to Congress.115 Congress accordingly dev eloped criteria for when and
how immigrants to the United States could gain citizenship.116 Origi-
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nally, this process was v ery simple and geographically diffused. For
more than a century, Congress allowed “any court of record”—
includinga district court, territorial court, or state court—to grant naturalization.117 Administrativ e power ov er naturalization did not
become centralized until 1990, when Congress changed the procedure
to create an administrativ e process for naturalization, superv ised by
the Attorney General.118 Ev en after the ex ecutiv e branch took ov er
primary responsibility for naturalization, the judiciary remained
inv olv ed; to this day, courts still administer the oath of citizenship.119
Despite naturalization procedures becoming more systematic,
denaturalization got scant attention in American law or policy dev elopment. After all, in the earliest years of the United States,
Americans supported open immigration and simple procedures to
obtain citizenship; “[i]t was a bigcountry; they needed folks to settle
it.”120
But ev en in these early years, naturalization procedures were
sometimes ov erlooked for political ex pedience. There was essentially
a power struggle between state and federal courts. Congress authorized state courts to naturalize new citizens.121 But while Congress
adopted naturalization procedures and requirements (including, for
ex ample, a fiv e-year waiting period),122 state courts did not always
follow them.123 Courts obtained significant rev enue from naturaliza-
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117 U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service—Populating a Nation: A History of
Immigration and Naturalization, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION [hereinafter
Populating a Nation], http://archiv e.li/mRgfx (last v isited Mar. 25, 2019) (notingthat courts
used their own processes and procedures for naturalization from 1802 until Congress
passed the 1906 Act); see also Gorbach v . Reno, 219 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2000)
(ex plaining that courts continued to ex ercise the naturalization power under Congress’s
procedures until 1990).
118 WEIL, supra note 110, at 51.
119 Id.
120 Populating a Nation, supra note 117.
121 See Bindczyck v . Finucane, 342 U.S. 76, 85 (1951) (“By giv ing State courts
jurisdiction in naturalization cases, Congress empowered some thousand State court judges
to adjudicate citizenship.”).
122 Gav oor & Miktus, supra note 116, at 647–48, 650 (ex plainingthat prior to 1906, an
applicant for naturalization had to demonstrate fiv e years of residence in the United States
as well as good moral character and attachment to the Constitution and that after 1906,
there was an additional ninety-day waiting period after the indiv idual had filed an
application before naturalization could be granted).
123 See WEIL, supra note 110, at 3 (“The state judiciary, howev er, did not always respect
citizenship requirements set by federal law.”).
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tion cases.124 Naturalizations also sometimes occurred en masse
before local elections, in an effort to create new v oters.125
In 1906, Congress adopted the Naturalization Act, which
attempted to prov ide uniform procedures for granting citizenship.126
The Act also prov ided the first statutory mechanism for denaturalization,127 and authorized U.S. district attorneys to bringsuit “upon affidav it showinggood cause therefor[e], to institute proceedings . . . for
the purpose of settingaside and cancelingthe certificate of citizenship
on the ground of fraud, or on the ground that such certificate of citizenship was illegally procured.”128
In addition to prov idinga statutory procedure for citizenship rev ocation, the Act also established new requirements for citizenship that
reflected changing beliefs about what it meant to be American. The
Act made anarchists and polygamists ineligible to become American
citizens.129 For the first time, citizenship eligibility depended on ev aluation of personal belief—not just on the length of residence or willingness to take an oath of citizenship.130
B. Early Growth of Denaturalization
The Naturalization Act of 1906 ex plicitly tied citizenship to political belief for the first time.131 But the connection between naturalization policy and national identity soon grew stronger, as the United
States began to grapple with what it meant to be an American—and
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124 See id. at 15 (“[N]aturalization was a means for the clerks of local courts to generate
rev enue.”).
125 See id. at 15, 16 & 204 n.8 (noting that in one month, two New York judges
naturalized fifty-four thousand indiv iduals, that the political machines used naturalization
as “a tool . . . to increase the number of loyal v oters on the ev e of local, states, and federal
elections,” and that “sev eral politicians were indicted for v iolating naturalization laws”
after it was found that the Saint Louis Court of Appeals had issued four hundred
fraudulent naturalization certificates in a single three-day span).
126 Naturalization Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-338, 34 Stat. 596; see also WEIL, supra
note 110, at 19 (summarizingthe procedures).
127 Gav oor & Miktus, supra note 116, at 649. Because naturalization in this era
happened through court proceedings, often in state court, some denaturalization actions
took place through the ordinary process by which judgments could be re-opened or
v acated. See Bindczyck v . Finucane, 342 U.S. 76, 81–82 (1951) (ex plainingthat prior to the
1906 Act, there were “widely div erse naturalization procedures,” resultingin “haphazard
denaturalization,” including a number of cases in which “the then circuit courts had
v acated naturalization orders at the suit of the Attorney General”).
128 Naturalization Act of 1906 § 15.
129 Id. § 7.
130 See Gav oor & Miktus, supra note 116, at 650 (noting the Act’s ex clusion of
anarchists and polygamists from eligibility for citizenship).
131 Id.
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with how that American identity should align with immigration, naturalization, and denaturalization policy.132
Part of that identity had to do with race and gender. Citizenshipstripping prov isions, in particular, reflected both gender and racial
inequities. Married women had no independent right to citizenship. A
federal statute adopted in 1907 prov ided that a woman would automatically lose her U.S. citizenship upon marriage to a foreign man,
and could regain citizenship only “[a]t the termination of the marital
relationship.”133 Likewise, the federal naturalization statute allowed
only “free white persons” and persons of African descent to become
naturalized—Asians were ineligible for naturalization (though still
constitutionally entitled to citizenship as “natural born citizens” if
born in the United States).134
When these requirements were brought into denaturalization
proceedings, both women and racial minorities risked losingtheir citizenship. A number of indiv iduals from India had gained citizenship in
the United States, for ex ample, only to find it summarily stripped
under the “illegal procurement” prong when the United States
Supreme Court held that they were not, in fact, white.135 The Court
stated that ev en though such indiv iduals were “of high-caste Hindu
stock . . . classified by certain scientific authorities as of the Caucasian
or Aryan race,” they would not be understood as “white” to the
“common man.”136 As a result of these holdings, not only did Indianborn men lose their citizenship, but American-born women married to
them automatically lost theirs as well, ev en though it rendered them
stateless.137 Mary Das, “a member of an old American family from the
41254-nyu_94-3 Sheet No. 58 Side A
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132 See WEIL, supra note 110, at 56 (“A naturalized person who was Asian, spoke out
against the war, or was a socialist, a communist, or a fascist risked the loss of his American
citizenship.”).
133 Act of March 2, 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-193, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228; see also Mackenzie v .
Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 312 (1915) (“[C]itizenship is of tangible worth, and we sympathize with
plaintiff in her desire to retain it . . . . [But] [t]he marriage of an American woman with a
foreigner has consequences . . . as long as the relation lasts, it is made tantamount to
ex patriation.”). This requirement was partially repealed by Congress in 1922 with the
passage of the Cable Act, and fully repealed in 1931. Jennifer M. Chacón, Loving Across
Borders: Immigration Law and the Limits of Lov ing, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 345, 357 (2007).
134 See United States v . Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 213–15 (1923); United States
v . WongKim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 701–02 (1898).
135 Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. at 213–15.
136 Id. at 214. This standard was subject to criticism from its inception. See Note, The
Nationality Act of 1940, 54 HARV. L. REV. 860, 865 (1941) (“This substitution of common
for scientific knowledge, while in keeping with legislativ e intent, did not establish a v ery
workable standard. The common man, like the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, is
not quite sure as to a Parsee’s racial status.”).
137 See Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian American History and the Loss of
Citizenship Through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 405, 433–34 (2005).
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South, of Rev olutionary ancestry, a woman of wealth and prominence,” who had married a naturalized citizen from India, described
suffering“the humiliation and the thought of not beingwanted as an
American citizen.”138
C. World Wars and the Fear of Communism

05/14/2019 08:58:42

138 Id. at 436 (quoting Hearing on H.R. 4057, H.R. 6238, and H.R. 9825 Before the H.
Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization, 69th Cong. 22–28 (1926) (statement of
Elizabeth Kite, Scholar, Library of Congress)).
139 See WEIL, supra note 110, at 86 (ex plaining that the “power to commence a
denaturalization proceeding was, in fact, quite discretionary,” and that “[i]t became,
perhaps as an inev itable result, a highly political, often symbolic tool of the U.S.
gov ernment”).
140 Id. at 57.
141 Id. at 58.
142 Id. at 61 (“At first I took this case of the U.S. Authorities of takingaway my papers
as a joke but now it turns out serious; altogether too serious.”).
143 Id. at 63.
144 Jared A. Goldstein, Unfit for the Constitution: Nativism and the Constitution, from the
Founding Fathers to Donald Trump, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 489, 523 (2018).
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Political denaturalization grew stronger duringthe first half of the
twentieth century, as the United States first fought two world wars
and subsequently looked inward to fight against a perceiv ed threat of
communist sympathy. In some cases, the gov ernment bureaucracy was
able to tie pre-ex isting naturalization requirements to more ex plicit
political goals. The discretion inherent in decidingto bringdenaturalization proceedings, combined with the likelihood of administrativ e
error somewhere in the naturalization process, made it relativ ely easy
for the gov ernment to target specific indiv iduals.139
Thus, for ex ample, Emma Goldman—a radical activ ist, anarchist,
and naturalized citizen—was targeted by the U.S. gov ernment, which
sought a way to denaturalize and deport her.140 Because she seemed
to hav e a v alid claim to citizenship, the gov ernment was worried that
arrestingher would “add to her prestige,” potentially “bringingher in
considerable sums in the way of contributions.”141 The gov ernment
therefore found another way: It inv estigated the citizenship of her
husband and found that he had been naturalized before the age of
eighteen. Because the Naturalization Act required applicants to be
legal adults, the gov ernment could cancel his naturalization ev en
many years later. Goldman, as a woman, lost her claim to citizenship
when her husband was denaturalized142 and was ultimately deported
from the United States in 1919.143
After World War I, the United States “entered a period of
increased nativ ism and hostility to immigrants.”144 The National
Origins Act limited immigration from countries deemed less desirable,
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Id. at 528.
Naturalization Act of 1906 § 4, Pub. L. No. 59-338, 34 Stat. 596; see also United
States v . Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 652 (1929) (“[O]ne who refuses or is unwillingfor any
purpose to bear arms because of conscientious considerations . . . . is not . . . held by the
ties of affection to any nation or gov ernment. Such persons are liable to be incapable of the
. . . dev otion to the principles of our Constitution that are required of aliens seeking
naturalization.”); Laura M. Weinrib, Freedom of Conscience in War Time: World War I and
the Limits of Civil Liberties, 65 EMORY L.J. 1051, 1121–22 (2016) (describingthe Court’s
rejection of Schwimmer’s claim).
147 See WEIL, supra note 110, at 93 (describingAttorney General Jackson’s efforts).
148 Id. at 94–95.
149 Id. at 100.
150 Id.
151 See, e.g., Baumgartner v . United States, 322 U.S. 665, 677 (1944) (concludingthat the
“ev idence as to Baumgartner’s attitude after [the date of naturalization] affords insufficient
proof that [at the time he naturalized] he had knowing reserv ations in forswearing his
allegiance to the Weimar Republic and embracing allegiance to this country so as to
warrant [denaturalization]”).
146
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greatly reducing the number of immigrants from Italy, Russia, and
Eastern Europe and “effectiv ely eliminat[ing]” immigration from
Japan.145 During this period, the Naturalization Act was also interpreted to ex clude large classes of potential citizens. Pacifists and conscientious objectors, for ex ample, were deemed unable to meet the
Naturalization Act’s requirement of “attachment to the principles of
the Constitution.”146
The 1940s saw significant growth in political denaturalization.
Attorney General Robert Jackson first sought to identify and denaturalize members of the German American National League, called the
“Bund,” a group sympathetic to Nazi aims.147 The Justice Department
submitted to Congress a proposed bill to allow the denaturalization
“for conduct that established a foreign allegiance” arising postnaturalization, but the bill was ultimately rejected by Congress after
intense lobbying from the American Civ il Liberties Union and the
Federation of Constitutional Liberties.148
The failure to pass the bill did not dampen the enthusiasm for
denaturalization attempts, howev er. In 1942, Attorney General
Francis Biddle created a new program “studying cases of disloyalty
among naturalized citizens.”149 In Biddle’s words, denaturalization
could be “a most important weapon in dealingwith organized subv ersiv e and disloyal activ ities . . . .”150
The gov ernment pursued denaturalization cases against Nazi
sympathizers—ev en when those sympathies dev eloped later, after the
indiv idual had been naturalized in the United States.151 Furthermore,
the gov ernment made a decision to publicize the program, as it made
political leaders look “tough” in wartime, and also was a way of
“appearingfair by demonstratingan apparent equality of treatment of
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Japanese and German Americans.”152 Of course, as scholar Patrick
Weil pointed out, this equality of treatment was an illusion at best—
Japanese immigrants were still barred from naturalization at the time,
and ev en nativ e-born Americans of Japanese descent were held in
internment camps.153
In addition to the ex ecutiv e branch ramping up the number of
denaturalizations, Congress also ex panded the scope of the denaturalization power duringthis time period. The 1940 Nationality Act prov ided “the first comprehensiv e rules gov erning ex patriation.”154 It
ex panded the behav iors by which citizenship could be lost for both
nativ e-born and naturalized citizens, includingsuch grounds as v oting
in foreign elections, acceptingemployment in certain foreign gov ernment positions, and, for children, residingfor six months or more in a
country that counted their parents as citizens—ev en if the parents had
been naturalized in the United States.155 In 1952, additional prov isions
were added aimed at countering a perceiv ed Communist threat and
allowing the denaturalization of indiv iduals engaged in “subv ersiv e
activ ities.”156
D. The Quiet Period

152

05/14/2019 08:58:42

WEIL, supra note 110, at 101.
Id.
154 Note, supra note 136, at 867.
155 Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, § 401, 54 Stat. 1137 (1940); see also
Note, supra note 136, at 869 (notingthat the prov ision for children “has been criticized as
beingbut a fragmentary effort to eliminate dual nationality acquired at birth”).
156 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 340, 66 Stat. 163
(1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537); see also Note, Protecting
Deportable Aliens from Physical Persecution: Section 243(h) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, 62 YALE L.J. 845, 845 & n.1 (1953) (ex pectingto see an increase in
the number of indiv iduals deported for “subv ersiv e activ ities” resultingfrom “the broader
prov isions for deportation on political grounds contained in the McCarran Act”). The Act
did, howev er, finally eliminate laws barringthe naturalization of Asian indiv iduals.
157 Note, supra note 136, at 869 (quoting86 CONG. REC. 11,948 (1940)); see also Note,
The Attorney-General and Aliens: Unlimited Discretion and the Right to Fair Treatment, 60
YALE L.J. 152, 157–59 (1951) (linking wide ex ecutiv e discretion with an increase in
political targeting).
158 See infra Part III.
153
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Ultimately, all of these prov isions were intended to unify an
American identity. The gov ernment’s goal was to ex clude those who
might be seen as disloyal or un-American, or “regarded as prospectiv e
‘fifth columnists.’ ”157 The constitutionality of these grounds for denaturalization, howev er, was hotly contested. The Supreme Court ev entually adopted greater citizenship protections in a highly div ided series
of cases.158 As discussed more fully in the nex t Part, that change

41254-nyu_94-3 Sheet No. 60 Side A

05/14/2019 08:58:42

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\94-3\NYU303.tx t

June 2019]

unknown

Seq: 28

(UN)CIVIL DENATURALIZATION

14-MAY-19

8:49

429

reduced the number of denaturalization cases initiated by the
gov ernment.159
A changing political env ironment, howev er, had an ev en bigger
impact. When the “Red Scare” of the mid-twentieth century receded
from public discourse, gov ernment officials lost their appetite for pursuingv ast numbers of denaturalization cases.160 A few cases still went
forward, including high-profile cases inv olv ing alleged war
criminals.161 And in the late 1990s, when naturalization procedures
were brought within the ex ecutiv e branch’s ov ersight, the Clinton
administration also sought to create administrativ e procedures for
denaturalization.162 The Ninth Circuit struck down the procedures,
howev er, concludingthat although Congress had delegated authority
to the Attorney General for naturalization, nothingin the statute delegated authority for denaturalization.163 The Clinton administration
decided not to appeal that ruling, instead choosing to abandon the
idea of administrativ e denaturalization.
Since the early 2000s, no President has attempted to reinstate
such a program, and Congress has not prov ided ex plicit authority for
one; denaturalization continues to require judicial action.164 In practice, howev er, denaturalization became ex ceedingly rare.165 In the
half-century between 1968 and 2018, only four denaturalization cases
reached the Supreme Court.166 After the ev ents of 9/11, some politi159

See infra Part III.
See WEIL, supra note 110, at 139, 178, 180 (notingthat the Supreme Court became
more activ e in pushing back against denaturalization after “the second Red Scare
declined,” but that ev en in cases where it is still av ailable, gov ernment officials
“substantially reduced” their reliance on it after 1967, ex cept against “those who hav e
committed the v ery worst crimes against their fellow human beings”).
161 See id. at 178–79 (summarizinggov ernment efforts to denaturalize “indiv iduals who
hav e committed gross v iolations of human rights”).
162 Rev ocation of Naturalization, 8 C.F.R. § 340.1 (1996); see also Gorbach v . Reno, 219
F.3d 1087, 1089–91 (9th Cir. 2000) (notingthe transfer of the naturalization power from the
courts to the INS); Catherine Yonsoo Kim, Note, Revoking Your Citizenship: Minimizing
the Likelihood of Administrative Error, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1448, 1465–66 (2001)
(describingthe political impetus for the proposed program).
163 Gorbach, 219 F.3d at 1093 (“The delegation that Congress ex pressly made to the
Attorney General was of ‘authority to naturalize’ citizens. There is no ex press delegation in
the statutes to the Attorney General to denaturalize citizens.” (quoting8 U.S.C. § 1421(a)
(2012))).
164 See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 340(a), 66 Stat.
163, 260 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (2012)) (requiringrev ocation
proceedings to be initiated in the district courts of the United States); DANIEL LEVY, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP AND NATURALIZATION HANDBOOK § 14:21 (Charles Roth ed., 2018) (“The
U.S. attorneys for the district where naturalization took place institute denaturalization
proceedings.”).
165 See WEIL, supra note 110, at 179 (“[B]etween 1907 and 1967, a total of 22,000
denaturalizations were concluded. [From 1968 to 2013], there [had] been fewer than 150.”).
166 See infra Section III.C.
160
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cians proposed increasing the use of denaturalization as a tool to
ex clude indiv iduals suspected of engaging in terrorist activ ity.167
Leaders of both political parties spoke up against the proposal, howev er, arguing that such a policy would v iolate both the Constitution
and v alued political norms. By 2013, a scholar specializingin the history of ex patriation concluded that denaturalization was largely a
policy of the past.168
III
THE SUPREME COURT’S LIMITS

ON

DENATURALIZATION

What happened in the courts while the political branches were
increasingtheir reliance on ex patriation and denaturalization as a tool
of political control? Duringthe middle part of the twentieth century,
the Supreme Court ov erturned a number of denaturalization decisions. Its decisions protected citizenship rights through v arying
approaches, including procedural due process, substantiv e due process, and statutory formalism. But it can be hard to draw clear principles from these decisions that would gov ern in later cases, because the
Court was often highly fractured. Some of the most important denaturalization decisions were decided only by a plurality of the Court, with
numerous separate writings. But ev en if the underlyingtheory of citizenship was fractured, unclear, and subject to change ov er time, the
judgments issued by the Supreme Court nev ertheless place real limits
on the political branches’ ability to wield denaturalization and ex patriation as political weapons.

The earliest—and perhaps most important—limits adopted by
the Supreme Court focused on procedural due process. First, the
Court adopted a heightened standard of proof for denaturalization
cases. In later decisions, the Court rev ersed a denaturalization that
had been decided by default, and in another denaturalization case, it
required a heightened standard of appellate rev iew. In spite of
adoptingpositions fav orable to the indiv iduals threatened with loss of
citizenship, howev er, the Court was unable to pull together a majority

05/14/2019 08:58:42

167 See Peter J. Spiro, Expatriating Terrorists, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169, 2169–70
(2014) (“The bipartisan rejection of such proposals presents a puzzle. . . . [H]igh-profile
efforts to legislate the termination of citizenship in the contex t of terrorist activ ities hav e
fallen flat in the United States. There is little chance that these proposals will be
resurrected.”).
168 See WEIL, supra note 110, at 180 (discussing the fact that “denaturalization has
largely become a thing of the past”); see also id. at 166 (naming the last chapter of the
leadingbook on denaturalization “American Citizenship is Secured”).
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in support of a unified rationale for those decisions. It therefore
remains unclear whether these procedural protections are grounded in
constitutional due process, or whether they are common-law rules
subject to legislativ e change.
Schneiderman: A Heightened Standard of Proof

1.

169

05/14/2019 08:58:42

320 U.S. 118 (1943).
See United States v . Schneiderman, 33 F. Supp. 510, 511 (N.D. Cal. 1940), aff’d, 119
F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1941), rev’d, 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
171 Id. at 513 (quotingIn re Saralieff, 59 F.2d 436, 436 (E.D. Mo. 1932)).
172 Id.
173 See id.
174 Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 122.
175 See id. at 165 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[W]here it has not done so in plain words,
we should be loathe to imply that Congress sanctioned a procedure which in absence of
fraud permitted a man’s citizenship to be attacked years after the grant because of his
political beliefs, social philosophy, or economic theories.”).
170
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In Schneiderman v. United States,169 the Supreme Court was
faced with a case of alleged naturalization fraud and illegal procurement. William Schneiderman had been a member of the Young
Workers League of America and the Workers Party of America
before his naturalization.170 As part of the naturalization process, he
was required to show that he was “attached to the principles of the
Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order
and happiness of the [United States].”171 These two organizations
were affiliated with the Communist Party, howev er, which the district
court found to be an organization that is “opposed to the principles of
the Constitution and adv ised, taught and adv ocated the ov erthrow of
the gov ernment by force and v iolence.”172 As a result of his membership in the affiliated groups, the district court concluded—twelv e
years after Schneiderman became a citizen of the United States—that
he had lacked the requisite good moral character at the time of his
naturalization and that his naturalization was therefore obtained
illegally.173
The Supreme Court rev ersed. In the majority opinion authored
by Justice Murphy, the Court noted that the gov ernment “proceeds
here not upon the charge of fraud but upon the charge of illegal procurement.”174 Schneiderman had not lied about his affiliations; it was
only after the fact that those affiliations were charged to be inconsistent with “good moral character” and attachment to constitutional
principles.175 The gov ernment’s position, howev er, was that he failed
to meet the good character requirement at the time of his naturalization and was therefore subject to rev ocation of his citizenship. To
Justice Rutledge, who authored a concurrence, this retrospectiv e
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rev iew of personal beliefs should hav e been enough to rev erse the
judgment; accordingto his opinion, that process was inconsistent with
constitutional principles, especially free-speech and freedom-ofconscience protections:
No citizen with such a threat hangingov er his head could be free. If
he belonged to “off-color” organizations or held too radical or, perhaps, too reactionary v iews, for some segment of the judicial palate,
when his admission took place, he could not open his mouth
without fear his words would be held against him. For whatev er he
might say or whatev er any such organization might adv ocate could
be hauled forth at any time to show “continuity” of belief from the
day of his admission, or “concealment” at that time. Such a citizen
would not be admitted to liberty. His best course would be silence
or hypocrisy. This is not citizenship.176

We hold . . . that where two interpretations of an organization’s program are possible, the one reprehensible and a bar to naturalization
and the other permissible, a court in a denaturalization proceeding,
assuming that it can re-ex amine a finding of attachment upon a
charge of illegal procurement, is not justified in cancelinga certifi176

05/14/2019 08:58:42

Id. at 167 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
See id. at 136 (majority opinion).
178 Id. at 122.
179 See id. at 125 (“To set aside such a grant the ev idence must be ‘clear, unequiv ocal,
and conv incing’—‘it cannot be done upon a bare preponderance of ev idence which leav es
the issue in doubt.’” (quotingUnited States v . Max well Land-Grant Co., 121 U.S. 325, 381
(1887))).
180 Id. at 154.
177
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The Court, howev er, rev ersed the judgment on somewhat narrower grounds aimed at procedural due process. It held that the gov ernment had not sufficiently prov ed illegal procurement, because the
ev idence did not show that Schneiderman personally lacked attachment to the Constitution or believ ed in gov ernmental ov erthrow.177
The Court stated that denaturalization was “more serious than a
takingof one’s property, or the imposition of a fine or other penalty,”
and citizenship could not be taken away “without the clearest sort of
justification and proof.”178
The Court specified two requirements that the ev idence must
meet. First, the total quantum of ev idence must be sufficient to support the finding—and in this regard, the ordinary civ il burden of “preponderance of the ev idence” would not be sufficient.179 Instead, the
facts must be prov en by “clear, unequiv ocal, and conv incing” ev idence.180 Second, when the ev idence lends itself to conflicting inferences, those inferences must be drawn to fav or the defendant in
danger of losinghis citizenship:
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cate of citizenship by imputingthe reprehensible interpretation to a
member of the organization in the absence of ov ert acts indicating
that such was his interpretation.181

Thus, the mere fact that Schneiderman belonged to two groups
affiliated with the Communist Party was insufficient to prov e his lack
of attachment to the Constitution. There was some ev idence that the
Party supported v iolent ov erthrow of the gov ernment, but there was
counterv ailingev idence that it sought change by peaceful means consistent with constitutional procedures.182 Without ev idence that
Schneiderman himself possessed the disqualifying belief, the district
court was bound to infer from the contradictory ev idence that
Schneiderman did not support v iolent ov erthrow.183
Baumgartner and Knauer: A More Searching Review on Appeal

2.

181

05/14/2019 08:58:42

Id. at 158–59.
See id. at 158.
183 See id. at 158–59.
184 See Knauer v . United States, 328 U.S. 654 (1946); Baumgartner v . United States, 322
U.S. 665 (1944).
185 See WEIL, supra note 110, at 132 (“[T]hat case [Schneiderman] nev er inv olv ed for me
any question as to the measure of proof required . . . . That fraud requires conv incingproof
is one of the commonplaces of the law—and hardly seemed to me in question.” (alteration
in original) (quotingJustice Frankfurter’s internal memo)); Steadman v . S.E.C., 450 U.S.
91, 105 (1981) (“At common law, it was plain that allegations of fraud had to be prov ed by
clear and conv incingev idence.”).
186 Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 125 (citing Maxwell Land-Grant Co., 121 U.S. at 381, a
fraud case applyingsuch a heightened standard of proof).
182
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Two cases ov er the nex t few years would reaffirm the heightened
standard of proof and ex pand the procedural protections to include a
more searchingrev iew on appeal.184 But ev en though the cases reaffirmed and ex panded the procedural protections giv en to defendants
in denaturalization cases, they made it clear that the Justices were not
in agreement about the basis of those procedural protections. Just one
year after Schneiderman was decided, internal court papers from
another denaturalization case—Baumgartner v. United States—
showed that Justice Frankfurter believ ed that the standard was simply
the ordinary heightened standard for prov ing fraud in a case at
equity.185 Certainly, the Schneiderman case had left the basis for the
rulingless than clear—and had indeed cited to a fraud case applying
the ordinary heightened standard.186 Justice Murphy, howev er,
believ ed that the Court had gone further in Schneiderman. He took
the opportunity in his concurrence in Baumgartner to reiterate his
v iew, pointingout that “[w]e ex pressly did not pass upon the charge of
fraud” in Schneiderman, and that “the requirement that the
Gov ernment prov e its case by ‘clear, unequiv ocal, and conv incing’ ev i-
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187
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Baumgartner, 322 U.S. at 678 (Murphy, J., concurring).
See id. at 670 (majority opinion) (“The measure of proof requisite to denaturalize a
citizen . . . must be clear and unequiv ocal.”).
189 Id. at 671.
190 Id. at 666.
191 See id. at 677.
192 Id.
193 See Knauer v . United States, 328 U.S. 654 (1946).
194 Id. at 660.
195 Id. at 675, 678 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
196 Id. at 678.
188
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dence . . . was a formulation by a majority of the Court of a rule of law
gov erningall denaturalization proceedings.”187
Although the Justices disagreed about the basis for the heightened burden of proof, they nonetheless agreed that it applied in
denaturalization cases.188 The Court further agreed that the heightened standard of proof also required heightened scrutiny on appeal to
determine “whether that ex actingstandard of proof had been satisfied
on the whole record.”189 For the defendant in Baumgartner, that
heightened standard made a difference. Baumgartner had been
accused of harboringNazi sympathies at the time of his naturalization
(thus allegedly showingthat he did not “support the Constitution and
laws of the United States and . . . giv e them true faith and allegiance”), and there was ev idence that he had spoken in fav or of Nazi
policies.190 But under the heightened standard of proof required, the
Court held that the record showed “insufficient proof” that he supported fascism when he took the oath of citizenship.191 As a result, the
Supreme Court rev ersed the underlying judgment and Baumgartner
was allowed to keep his citizenship.192
Two years later, in Knauer v. United States, the Court returned to
the Schneiderman standard.193 Ultimately, it found that the ev identiary requirement had been “plainly met,” concludingthat the defendant was a “thoroughgoing Nazi and a faithful follower of Adolph
Hitler,” who had falsely sworn otherwise at the time of his naturalization.194 Again, howev er, the Court was not unanimous. Justices
Rutledge and Murphy dissented, agreeing that the ev idence showed
Knauer to be “a thorough-going Nazi, addicted to philosophies altogether hostile to the democratic framework in which we believ e and
liv e,” but assertingthat denaturalization v iolated constitutional principles.195 “[C]itizens with strings attached to their citizenship, for its rev ocation, can be neither free nor secure in their status.”196
In both the majority opinion and the dissent, the Justices placed
great reliance on the heightened ev identiary standard. The majority
suggested that the standard was required for due process in a denatu-
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ralization proceeding, statingthat the consequence of denaturalization
could be sev ere enough to “result in the loss ‘of all that makes life
worth liv ing,’ ” and therefore cannot be left to “conjecture”; otherwise, “v aluable rights would rest upon a slender reed” and be v ulnerable to shifting political winds.197 According to the majority, this
meant that not only did the trial court hav e to be persuaded by
“‘clear, unequiv ocal, and conv incing’ ev idence, which does not leav e
‘the issue in doubt,’ ” but also that the appellate court has a duty to
“reex amine the facts” found by the lower courts.198
Justice Rutledge’s dissent agreed, stating that ev en “if [he] may
be wrong”199 in concluding that denaturalization itself is
unconstitutional:
[C]ertainly so drastic a penalty as denaturalization, with resulting
deportation and ex ile and all the attendant consequences, should
not be imposed by any procedure less protectiv e of the citizen’s
most fundamental right . . . . [A]t the least this should be done only
by those forms of proceedingmost fully surrounded with the constitutional securities for trial which are amongthe prized incidents of
citizenship.200

He pointed out that loss of citizenship entailed a loss of liberty
ev en greater than incarceration in a criminal action, stating that it is
“altogether anomalous that those safeguards are thrown about . . .
when, for some offense, his liberty ev en for brief periods is at stake,
but are withdrawn from him when all that giv es substance to that
freedom is put in jeopardy.”201

In 1948, the Court again grappled with the basis of the
Schneiderman ruling: Did it create a procedural due process right that
could be ex tended to forbid default judgment? A majority of the
Court agreed that a judgment denaturalizing August Klapprott by
default needed to be rev ersed, though the Court was sharply div ided
on both reasoning and outcome and did not produce a majority
opinion.202 Klapprott was a member of the German American Bund,
accused of sympathy to Nazi Germany and disloyalty to the United

05/14/2019 08:58:42

197 See id. at 658 (majority opinion) (quotingSchneiderman v . United States, 320 U.S.
118, 159 (1943)); id. at 659 (quotingNgFungHo v . White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922)).
198 Id. at 657 (quotingSchneiderman, 320 U.S. at 158).
199 Id. at 678 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
200 Id.
201 Id. at 678–79.
202 See Klapprott v . United States, 335 U.S. 601, 615–16 (1949) (presenting the final
disposition of the case through plurality opinion).
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3. Later Cases: Continued Questions About the Basis for
Heightened Procedural Protections
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States. While his civ il denaturalization suit was pending, howev er, he
was arrested and confined to jail on federal criminal charges. His
criminal conv iction was later ov erturned by the Supreme Court in a
case unrelated to the denaturalization proceeding.203 He had been
unable to afford an attorney to represent him in the civ il case, and his
incarceration prev ented him from appearingpersonally at the denaturalization trial.204 As a result, the district court granted a default judgment of denaturalization.205
The Supreme Court rev ersed the judgment. Fiv e Justices agreed
with the ultimate result, but they div erged in their rationales. Justice
Black wrote the plurality opinion (joined by Justice Douglas). He
cited Schneiderman for the proposition that “because of the grav e
consequences incident to denaturalization proceedings we hav e held
that a burden rests on the Gov ernment to prov e its charges in such
cases by clear, unequiv ocal and conv incing ev idence which does not
leav e the issue in doubt.”206 In his v iew, the burden required for
denaturalization “is substantially identical with that required in criminal cases—proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”207 He concluded that
the gov ernment had not met this standard in the court below.
Justice Rutledge concurred in an opinion joined by Justice
Murphy, and would hav e gone ev en further. They reiterated their
v iew that denaturalization was unconstitutional in its entirety, writing
that “[t]o take away a man’s citizenship depriv es him of a right no less
precious than life or liberty, indeed of one which today comprehends
those rights and almost all others.”208 They also emphasized the lack
of procedural safeguards, notingthat:

The plurality similarly noted the lack of procedural safeguards,
emphasizingthat a default judgment necessarily lacks the procedural
protections of a true adv ersarial proceeding:
The undenied allegations already set out show that a citizen was
stripped of his citizenship by his Gov ernment, without ev idence, a
203
204
206
207
208
209

05/14/2019 08:58:42

205

See id. at 607.
See id. at 608.
See id.
Id. at 612 (citingSchneiderman v . United States, 320 U.S. 118, 158 (1943)).
Id.
Id. at 616 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
Id. at 617.
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[B]y the dev ice or label of a civ il suit, carried forward with none of
the safeguards of criminal procedure prov ided by the Bill of Rights,
this most comprehensiv e and basic right of all, so it has been held,
can be taken away and in its wake may follow the most cruel penalty of banishment.209
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hearing, or the benefit of counsel, at a time when his Gov ernment
was then holdingthe citizen in jail with no reasonable opportunity
for him effectiv ely to defend his right to citizenship.210

210
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Id. at 615 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 617–18 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
212 See id. at 612–13 (plurality opinion) (“[I]t is our opinion that courts should not . . .
depriv e a person of his citizenship until the Gov ernment first offers proof of its charges
sufficient to satisfy the burden imposed on it, ev en in cases where the defendant has made
default in appearance.”).
213 444 U.S. 252 (1980).
214 See 8 U.S.C. § 1481(b) (“Any person who commits or performs . . . any act of
ex patriation . . . shall be presumed to hav e done so v oluntarily, but such presumption may
be rebutted upon a showing, by a preponderance of the ev idence, that the act or acts
committed or performed were not done v oluntarily.”); Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 264–65
(discussingCongressional passage of § 1481(b) in response to the heightened ev identiary
standard).
211
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Although Justices Rutledge and Murphy had not been able to get
a majority of the Court to sign on for this v iew, they did agree that
Schneiderman required, at the v ery least, substantially heightened due
process. They again compared it to the constitutional standard
required in criminal cases, writing that Schneiderman “required a
burden of proof for denaturalization which in effect approx imates the
burden demanded for conv iction in criminal cases, namely, proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of the charges alleged as cause for denaturalization,” and that it did so “in v iew of the substantial kinship of the
proceedings with criminal causes,” and with the understanding that
“ordinary civ il procedures, such as apply in suits upon contracts and to
enforce other purely civ il liabilities, do not suffice for denaturalization
and all its consequences.”211 Furthermore, the defendant’s failure to
show up to trial did not reliev e the gov ernment of the need to meet
that heightened burden.212
More than thirty years later, howev er, there was substantial turnov er in the Court—but the Court still seemed at odds ov er the basis
for Schneiderman’s procedural protections. In Vance v. Terrazas, a
Mex ican-American dual national was alleged to hav e v oluntarily
giv en up his citizenship.213 Congress had enacted a statute prov iding
that proof of v oluntary ex patriation should be measured by the ordinary civ il “preponderance of the ev idence” standard, rather than the
heightened “clear and conv incing” standard that the Supreme Court
had applied in denaturalization cases.214 The Supreme Court div ided
ov er the question of whether the standard of proof was of commonlaw origin (and thus subject to beingov erruled by an act of Congress)

41254-nyu_94-3 Sheet No. 64 Side B

05/14/2019 08:58:42

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\94-3\NYU303.tx t

438

unknown

Seq: 37

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

14-MAY-19

8:49

[Vol. 94:402

or whether it was of constitutional origin.215 The Court in that case
held that the gov ernment had not sufficiently shown that the dual
national had intended to ex patriate himself, thus allowinghim to keep
his American citizenship.216 In dicta, howev er, a majority of the Court
sided with the common-law v iew of the standard of proof, listing
Schneiderman as one of sev eral cases that “did not purport to be [a]
constitutional ruling.”217 The Court further distinguished decisions
adoptinga heightened standard in criminal cases, statingthat “ex patriation proceedings are civ il in nature and do not threaten a loss of
liberty.”218
Again, howev er, the opinion drew sharp disagreement from those
who believ ed that a heightened ev identiary standard was constitutionally mandated. Justice Marshall wrote that he “cannot understand,
much less accept, the Court’s suggestion that ‘ex patriation proceedings . . . do not threaten a loss of liberty.’”219 He believ ed that a “clear
and conv incing” standard of proof in ex patriation and denaturalization cases was required under the Constitution.220 Justice Stev ens
wrote a separate opinion likewise statingthat:
In my judgment a person’s interest in retaining his American citizenship is surely an aspect of “liberty” of which he cannot be
depriv ed without due process of law. . . . [I] believ e that due process
requires that a clear and conv incingstandard of proof be met in this
case as well before the depriv ation may occur.221

05/14/2019 08:58:42

215 See id. at 264 (disagreeing with the appellate court’s determination that Congress
was without constitutional authority to set the standard of proof in ex patriation
proceedings).
216 Id. at 263.
217 See id. at 266–67.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 271 (Marshall, J., concurringin part and dissentingin part).
220 Id. at 272.
221 Id. at 274 (Stev ens, J., concurringin part and dissentingin part).
222 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
223 See id. at 505–06 (“The ev idence justifyingrev ocation of citizenship must be ‘clear,
unequiv ocal, and conv incing’ and not leav e ‘the issue in doubt.’ . . . And in rev iewing
denaturalization cases, we hav e carefully ex amined the record ourselv es.” (quoting
Schneiderman v . United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943))). It is worth noting, howev er, that
Justice Stev ens believ ed the ev idence in Fedorenko failed to meet this ex actingstandard;
he believ ed the ev idence supported the conclusion that Fedorenko had been forced
inv oluntarily into his position, and that his actions therefore did not disqualify him from
citizenship. Id. at 533 (Stev ens, J., dissenting) (“I cannot accept the v iew that any citizen’s
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Just a year later, in Fedorenko v. United States, the Supreme
Court upheld the denaturalization of a man who had concealed his
past as a concentration-camp guard.222 In its decision, the Court
applied Schneiderman’s heightened burden of proof and
Baumgartner’s more searching appellate rev iew.223 This time, the
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Court’s majority opinion implied that such procedural protections
were constitutionally required: “Any less ex actingstandard would be
inconsistent with the importance of the right that is at stake in a
denaturalization proceeding.”224
The Court’s back-and-forth ov er the source of the heightened
procedural protections in denaturalization makes it difficult to determine the scope of legislativ e power—and difficult to predict how
future cases will come out. But whether the requirement for a heightened ev identiary burden is grounded in the Constitution or in the
common law likely makes little difference for modern cases, as
Congress’s lower standard applies only in v oluntary ex patriation cases
and has not been ex panded to apply to inv oluntary denaturalization.
Thus, modern denaturalization cases must be guided at least by a
“clear and conv incing” standard of proof, and the scope of appellate
rev iew must be commensurate with the heightened burden of proof.225
B. Substantive Constitutional Protections
While the Supreme Court’s cases based on procedural due process dealt with the question of how citizenship could be taken away,
the Court also decided sev eral cases on substantiv e grounds that
looked at the question of whether citizenship could be taken away
under certain circumstances. The Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution is central to both of these questions, as substance and
procedure are so closely intertwined as to be inseparable.226
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past inv oluntary conduct can prov ide the basis for stripping him of his American
citizenship.”).
224 Id. at 505–06 (majority opinion).
225 See Kungys v . United States, 485 U.S. 759, 772 (1988) (holdingthat the elements of a
denaturalization claim “must be met, of course, by ev idence that is clear, unequiv ocal, and
conv incing”); United States v . Muthara, 737 F. App’x 426, 427–28 (10th Cir. 2018) (citing
Fedorenko for the proposition that “ev idence justifyingrev ocation of citizenship must be
clear, unequiv ocal, and conv incingand not leav e the issue in doubt”).
226 As Professor Peter Rubin has pointed out, “What we would ordinarily call
procedural rights can be characterized as substantiv e, and substantiv e rights can often be
defined in terms of procedure.” Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive
Due Process, Procedural Due Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 848
(2003) (ex plaining that the incorporation of the Six th Amendment right to a jury trial is
commonly considered a substantiv e due process guarantee “incorporatingthe ‘substantiv e’
right to a jury trial before a criminal conv iction,” but pointing out that it is also “a
procedural trial right that one can imagine being imposed, in the absence of the Six th
Amendment, as a requirement of procedural due process”); Timothy Sandefur, Why
Substantive Due Process Makes Sense, CATO UNBOUND (Feb. 6, 2012), https://www.catounbound.org/2012/02/06/timothy-sandefur/why-substantiv e-due-process-makes-sense
(arguing that “[p]rocedural due process is a subset of substantiv e due process,” and that
“[o]ne might think of a trial as a procedural right, but a trial is composed of certain
substantiv e rights—the right to cross-ex amine witnesses, the right to be represented by an
attorney, the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself”).
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Cases of ex patriation—that is, takingcitizenship away from indiv iduals ev en if born in the United States, often as a sanction for conduct deemed inconsistent with citizenship—prov ed to be particularly
div isiv e, though the Court ultimately held that indiv iduals could not
be ex patriated without their v oluntary consent. The holding was
ex tended in a subsequent case to naturalized citizens. In reaching
these decisions, howev er, the Court was ev en more div ided than it had
been on the procedural questions—and once again, the driv ingforce
behind that disagreement was an inability to reach a common theory
of citizenship.
1. Limiting Expatriation as Punishment

227

356 U.S. 86, 87 (1958).
Id.
229 See id. at 88 (“In 1952 petitioner applied for a passport. His application was denied
on the ground that under the prov isions of Section 401(g) of the Nationality Act of 1940, as
amended, he had lost his citizenship by reason of his conv iction and dishonorable discharge
for wartime desertion.”).
230 Id. at 104–05 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 105 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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When Congress adopted citizenship-stripping laws aimed at
v arious forms of behav ior deemed to be incompatible with citizenship—includingv otingin a foreign election, serv ingin a foreign military, leav ingthe country to av oid U.S. military serv ice, and others—
these laws were challenged as unconstitutional forms of punishment.
Trop v. Dulles was one such case in which the Supreme Court was
faced with the question of whether citizenship could be taken away as
a punitiv e measure for v oluntary behav ior.227 The petitioner, Albert
Trop, was a nativ e-born U.S. citizen who serv ed in the U.S. military in
Morocco duringWorld War II.228 During this time, he was sent to a
military stockade as punishment for an infraction. He then escaped
from the stockade, but returned to base and turned himself in after
spending less than a day away. Nonetheless, he was court-martialed,
conv icted of wartime desertion, sentenced to three years’ confinement, and dishonorably discharged. Fiv e years after he completed his
sentence, he applied for a passport and discov ered only then that he
had also been stripped of his citizenship and was therefore ineligible
to obtain a passport.229 He filed suit seeking a declaration of
citizenship.
When Trop’s case reached the Supreme Court, the Justices
sharply div ided ov er the outcome. A majority of the Court held that
Trop’s denationalization v iolated the Constitution, but less than a
majority agreed on the rationale.230 Chief Justice Warren wrote the
opinion for a four-judge plurality, concluding that denationalization
228
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Id. at 101–02 (plurality opinion).
Id.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 107, 112 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 121–22 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
See id. at 125.
Kennedy v . Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 147 (1963).
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v iolated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment and statingthat the indiv idual who is stripped of citizenship “has lost the right to hav e rights.”231 He ex plained that ex patriation puts the indiv idual at risk of deportation, causes “the total
destruction of the indiv idual’s status in organized society,” and “strips
the citizen of his status in the national and international political community.”232 Taken together, the plurality found these consequences to
be “a form of punishment more primitiv e than torture.”233
While the plurality’s language was strong, it did not garner a
majority of the Court. Justice Brennan declined to join the majority
opinion and concurred in the judgment, writing separately that
Congress ex ceeded its authority under the war power because the
ex patriation was intended as “naked v engeance,” and was not reasonably calculated “to further the ultimate congressional objectiv e—the
successful waging of war.”234 In less egregious circumstances, howev er, he suggested that ex patriation could be within the war power of
the legislativ e branch.
Justice Frankfurter dissented, joined by Justices Burton, Clark,
and Harlan. The dissent argued that denationalization for wartime
desertion fit easily within Congress’s war power; it referred to military
serv ices as “this ultimate duty of American citizenship,” and stated
that “Congress might reasonably hav e believ ed the morale and
fighting efficiency of our troops would be impaired if our soldiers
knew that their fellows who had abandoned them in their time of
greatest need were to remain in the communion of our citizens.”235
The dissent also disagreed that loss of citizenship was the harsh penalty that the plurality and Justice Brennan believ ed. Instead, the dissent said, ex patriation was far less harsh than the death penalty, which
was also a potential consequence of wartime desertion.236
In 1963, the Supreme Court again turned to the question of ex patriation as punishment. Francisco Mendoza-Martinez, a Mex icanAmerican dual national, left the United States in 1942 “solely, as he
admits, for the purpose of ev ading military serv ice in our armed
forces.”237 When he returned to the United States, he was arrested
and conv icted of failing to comply with the selectiv e serv ice laws.
After serv inghis time, he was released—but fiv e years later, the gov -
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Id. at 146–47 n.1.
See id. at 164 (noting Congress’s “great power[ ]” to conduct war and regulate
foreign relations).
240 Trop, 356 U.S. at 87–88.
241 Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 166 (quoting Ng Fung Ho v . White, 259 U.S. 276,
284–85 (1922)); see also Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 284 (“To deport one who so claims to be
a citizen obv iously depriv es him of liberty, as was pointed out in Chin Yow v. United States,
208 U.S. 8, 13 [1908]. It may result also in loss of both property and life, or of all that
makes life worth liv ing.”).
242 Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 167.
243 Id.
239
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ernment sought to deport him, allegingthat he had lost his citizenship
under Section 401(j) of the Nationality Act of 1940, which prov ided
that: “A person who is a national of the United States, whether by
birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by . . . . [d]eparting
from or remainingoutside of the jurisdiction of the United States in
time of war . . . .”238
The Supreme Court concluded that this prov ision of the statute
was unconstitutional. The majority opinion noted that Congress had a
great deal of latitude under the foreign-relations and war powers,239
and certainly there was a clearer connection to the war power in
Mendoza-Martinez than there had been in Trop. Mendoza-Martinez,
after all, had entirely ev aded the draft—thus missingmilitary serv ice
entirely. Trop, on the other hand, missed only one day of military serv ice, returned to his post v oluntarily when he was “cold and hungry,”
and caused no actual harm to military objectiv es.240 Nev ertheless, the
Court said, the sanction of ex patriation was a consequence so serious
that it could depriv e an indiv idual “of all that makes life worth
liv ing.”241 As a result, it could not follow from a mere civ il action: “If
the sanction these sections impose is punishment, and it plainly is, the
procedural safeguards required as incidents of a criminal prosecution
are lacking.”242 Therefore, the Court held, the heightened process of a
criminal case would be required before such a serious punishment
could be imposed. “[T]he Fifth and Six th Amendments mandate that
this punishment cannot be imposed without a prior criminal trial and
all its incidents, includingindictment, notice, confrontation, jury trial,
assistance of counsel, and compulsory process for obtaining witnesses.”243 The Court acknowledged that its holding might legitimately be criticized for “immunizing the draft ev ader,” but it
prioritized the underlyingcitizenship interest and the procedures that
protect that interest, writingthat “the Bill of Rights which we guard so
jealously and the procedures it guarantees are not to be abrogated
merely because a guilty man may escape prosecution or for any other
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ex pedient reason.”244 Thus, after Mendoza-Martinez, ex patriation as a
sanction for v oluntary behav ior would require criminal process.245
2. Curtailing Involuntary Expatriation

244

05/14/2019 08:58:42

Id. at 184.
This case presented another ex ample of the interplay between substantiv e and
procedural due process. See supra note 226 (discussing further the relationship between
these two aspects of due process). The Court spoke of the “procedural safeguards” of the
Fifth and Six th Amendments, which the Court v iewed as essential to av oid arbitrarily
strippingthe substantiv e protections of citizenship. See Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 166
(discussing the purpose of the Fifth and Six th Amendments as prov iding procedural
protections).
246 Perez v . Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 62 (1958), overruled in part by Afroyim v . Rusk, 387
U.S. 253 (1967).
247 Id. at 45–46 (quotingthe Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853 54 Stat. 1137,
1168 (1940) as amended by the Act of September 27, 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-431, 58 Stat. 746
(1944)).
248 Id. at 46, 62.
249 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
250 Id. at 164.
251 See Chacón, supra note 133, at 357 (notingCongress’s 1931 repeal of the prov ision
that stripped women of their citizenship for marryinga foreigner).
252 Schneider, 377 U.S. at 164.
245

41254-nyu_94-3 Sheet No. 67 Side A

Duringthe mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court also struggled with an ev en more fundamental question: Does the Constitution
allow citizenship to be inv oluntarily taken away? The question sharply
div ided both the Court and the public. The Court’s first answer to that
question, in Perez v. Brownell, was “yes.”246 At issue in that case was
a federal ex patriation statute, which prov ided that: “[A] person who is
a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization,
shall lose his nationality”247 if they are inv olv ed in certain kinds of
conduct, including: v otingin a political election in a foreign state, or
leav ingthe country to av oid the military draft. The Court concluded
that Congress had the right to pass such an ex patriation statute as part
of its foreign affairs authority under the Constitution. In this 5-4
opinion, the Court upheld the ex patriation of a nativ e-born U.S. citizen who had v oted in a Mex ican election, and was therefore held to
hav e ex patriated himself.248
Six years later, howev er, the Supreme Court shed some doubt on
the Perez holdingin Schneider v. Rusk.249 Angelika Schneider was a
naturalized American citizen born in Germany. She later married a
German citizen and mov ed with her husband to liv e there.250 By the
early 1960s, women no longer lost U.S. citizenship merely by marrying
a foreigner.251 Nonetheless, Congress had passed a statute prov iding
that naturalized citizens (regardless of gender) who mov ed back to
their country of origin would lose their U.S. citizenship.252 The Court
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Id. at 168–69.
Id. at 168 (quoting Bolling v . Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)). The relationship
between due process and equal protection at the federal lev el has become known by the
shorthand “rev erse incorporation,” a concept usually associated with Bolling. Richard A.
Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 976 (2004) (discussing the relationship
between Bolling and rev erse incorporation).
255 See Schneider, 377 U.S. at 168–69 (noting that the statutory distinction made
between nativ e-born citizens and naturalized citizens constitutes unequal treatment).
256 Id. at 168.
257 Id. at 169.
258 Afroyim v . Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 254 (1967).
259 Id. at 254–55.
260 Id. at 255–56.
261 See id. at 257 (rejectingthe central premise of Perez).
262 Id.
263 Id. at 262.
254
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held the statute unconstitutional because it treated nativ e-born citizens more fav orably than naturalized citizens.253 The Court noted that
“the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause,” but that
it does “forbid discrimination that is ‘so unjustifiable as to be v iolativ e
of due process.’ ”254 In the Court’s opinion, the treatment of naturalized citizens under the statute qualified as just such a v iolation.255
Nativ e-born citizens, after all, could liv e abroad with no fear of losing
their citizenship.256 Treating naturalized citizens differently “creates
. . . a second-class citizenship” and “in no way ev idences a v oluntary
renunciation of nationality and allegiance.”257
In 1967—less than a decade after Perez—the Court would return
to the question of constitutional power to rev oke citizenship in the
absence of affirmativ e intent to giv e up citizenship. This time, the
Court would ex tend the principle it had announced in Schneider and
formally ov errule Perez. The case inv olv ed Beys Afroyim, a naturalized U.S. citizen who mov ed to Israel and v oted in an election for the
Israeli Knesset.258 He then sought a declaratory judgment affirming
his U.S. citizenship, ex pressly seeking to ov erturn the Perez case.259
The Court noted that Perez had not been well-receiv ed; it stated that
the case “has been a source of controv ersy and confusion ev er since,”
and that the Court’s later cases “as well as many commentators,” had
“cast great doubt upon the soundness of Perez.”260
In its 5-4 opinion, the Court adopted the dissenters’ v iew from
Perez. 261 The Court first rejected the idea that “Congress has any general power, ex press or implied, to take away an American citizen’s
citizenship without his assent.”262 It then grounded its holding more
firmly in the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment,263 which
prov ides that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
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States.”264 The purpose of this Amendment, according to the Court,
was to firmly establish the right of citizenship and to take it out of the
hands of the legislature265—particularly in the post-Civ il-War era,
when legislators might hav e tried to limit the political rights of indiv iduals formerly held in slav ery.266 Ev en though the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment were focused on the end of slav ery rather
than the permissibility of ex patriation, the Court concluded that the
principles of liberty and equal justice ex pressed in the Fourteenth
Amendment required ov erruling Perez. 267 Indeed, the Court said,
“The v ery nature of our free gov ernment makes it completely incongruous to hav e a rule of law under which a group of citizens temporarily in office can depriv e another group of citizens of their
citizenship.”268
C. A Retreat to Statutory Formalism

264

05/14/2019 08:58:42

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 263 (“Though the framers of the Amendment were not
particularly concerned with the problem of ex patriation, it seems undeniable from the
language they used that they wanted to put citizenship beyond the power of any
gov ernmental unit to destroy.”).
266 See id. at 267–68 (“Citizenship is no light trifle to be jeopardized any moment
Congress decides to do so under the name of one of its general or implied grants of
power.”).
267 See id. at 268 (ex plainingthat the Court’s outcome is necessary to be consistent with
the principles ex pressed in the Fourteenth Amendment).
268 Id. at 268.
269 See, e.g., Rogers v . Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971) (holdingthat Afroyim protection from
denaturalization only ex tends to those born or naturalized in the United States).
270 See WEIL, supra note 110, at 176–77 (detailing Chief Justice Warren’s resignation,
which left the Court equally div ided on Afroyim, and the Court’s quick grant of certiorari
to a potential rev ersal v ehicle in Bellei).
271 Id. at 176.
265
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The ruling in Afroyim sounded as if it might put the issue of
denaturalization to rest once and for all. But ev en though the decision
got a majority opinion, it was still seen as v ulnerable by those dissatisfied with the ruling.269 It was, after all, a 5-4 decision rev ersinga different 5-4 decision less than a decade old.
A year later, Chief Justice Warren’s resignation from the Court
seemed to present an opportunity for a quick rev ersal of Afroyim.270
And one case appeared to offer the perfect v ehicle: Aldo Bellei, who
was born and raised in Italy but possessed American citizenship
through his mother, challenged a law that would strip the citizenship
of indiv iduals born abroad who failed to liv e in the United States for
at least fiv e years between the ages of fourteen and twenty-eight.271
Indeed, President Nix on’s new appointee, Harry Blackmun, wrote in

41254-nyu_94-3 Sheet No. 68 Side B

05/14/2019 08:58:42

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\94-3\NYU303.tx t

446

unknown

Seq: 45

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

14-MAY-19

8:49

[Vol. 94:402

05/14/2019 08:58:42

272 See id. at 177 (discussingJustice Blackmun’s memo outlininghis belief that Afroyim
and Schneider were wrongly decided).
273 See id. (ex plainingJustice Harlan’s jurisprudential approach).
274 See Bellei, 401 U.S. at 830 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship
clause was “restricted to the combination of three factors, each and all significant: birth in
the United States, naturalization in the United States, and subjection to the jurisdiction of
the United States” and therefore “obv iously did not apply to any acquisition of citizenship
by beingborn abroad of an American parent”).
275 Maslenjak v . United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017); Kungys v . United States, 485 U.S.
759 (1988); Fedorenko v . United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981); Vance v . Terrazas, 444 U.S.
252 (1980).
276 Afroyim v . Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267 (1967).
277 See supra Section III.A.3.
278 Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 266.
279 See id. at 252 n.1 (describingprov isions of the Immigration and Nationality Act that
deem certain conduct as v oluntary acts of ex patriation).
280 See id. at 263 (rejecting the gov ernment’s v iew that ev idence of intent is not
necessary under the statute).
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an early memo to the Court that he was inclined to ov errule
Afroyim.272
Howev er, one of the Justices who had dissented in Afroyim was
nev ertheless unwilling to ov errule it—Justice John Harlan believ ed
strongly in followingprecedent ev en when he disagreed with a case on
the merits.273 As a result, the decision in Bellei left Afroyim undisturbed by walkinga narrow tex tual ground—because the Fourteenth
Amendment’s citizenship clause only applies to those “born” or “naturalized” in the United States, the Court held that it did not prohibit
the inv oluntary ex patriation of Aldo Bellei, who was a natural-born
citizen born in Italy.274
With the Afroyim holding left undisturbed (though narrowly
interpreted), fewer denaturalization cases entered the litigation pipeline; in the four decades after Bellei reaffirmed the central holdingof
Afroyim, only four such cases hav e reached the Supreme Court.275 All
four of those cases would continue to apply a narrow and formalist
approach; none would return to Afroyim’s broad statements of “liberty and equal justice.”276
One of those cases was Vance v. Terrazas, discussed abov e,277
which interpreted the standard for “v oluntary” ex patriation.278
Congress had passed laws prov idingthat certain conduct (v otingin a
foreign election; serv ing in a foreign military) was inconsistent with
citizenship and would be deemed to prov ide conclusiv e ev idence that
an indiv idual had v oluntarily abandoned U.S. citizenship.279 In
Terrazas, howev er, the Supreme Court shut down this approach, concludingthat an ex patriation action must be supported by ev idence of
affirmativ e intent to giv e up citizenship—intent cannot be inferred
from foreign serv ice alone.280 The decision protected indiv iduals by
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281 See id. at 261 (holdingthat, under the statute, a trier of fact must find that the citizen
v oluntarily committed the act and, in so doing, intended to relinquish their citizenship).
282 See id. (using statutory interpretation to find that the statute must be read to
proscribe only conduct where the citizen v oluntarily relinquishes citizenship).
283 See Afroyim v . Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267 n.23 (1967) (“Of course, as The Chief Justice
said in his dissent . . . naturalization unlawfully procured can be set aside.”).
284 WEIL, supra note 110, at 179 (noting that recently, “only a few dozen” indiv iduals
had lost citizenship as a result of naturalization fraud, which is a marked decline from the
number of denaturalizations before 1968, when more av enues for denaturalization were
av ailable).
285 449 U.S. 490, 494 (1981).
286 Id. at 497.
287 Id. at 495 (quoting Constitution of the International Refugee Organization pt. II,
Dec. 16, 1946, 62 Stat. 3037, T.I.A.S. No. 1846).
288 Id. at 500.
289 Id. at 505.

41254-nyu_94-3 Sheet No. 69 Side A

interpreting“v oluntariness” to require an indiv idual intent to giv e up
citizenship—not just an intent to engage in an action that Congress
deemed inconsistent with citizenship.281 Again, howev er, the opinion
was a narrow one takinga v ery formal interpretation of the relev ant
language;282 it did nothing to clarify the underlying constitutional
interests at stake.
The remainingthree cases dealt with indiv iduals whose naturalization was originally procured illegally or by fraudulent means. In a
footnote, the Afroyim majority had left open a remaining route for
denaturalization: setting aside cases where naturalization had
occurred fraudulently or unlawfully.283 Post-1967, “fraud during the
naturalization process” became the primary av enue left for
denaturalization.284
The first case, Fedorenko v. United States, inv olv ed a defendant
who had allegedly serv ed as a concentration-camp guard in Treblinka,
Poland duringWorld War II.285 The gov ernment brought a denaturalization suit against Fedorenko, allegingthat he fraudulently concealed
this background to obtain naturalization.286 Furthermore, the statute
that allowed Fedorenko to immigrate to the United States as a “displaced person,” specifically ex cluded indiv iduals who “assisted the
enemy in persecuting civ il[ians]” or who “v oluntarily assisted the
enemy forces.”287 Fedorenko admitted that he had been a guard at
Treblinka, but claimed that his actions were inv oluntary, arguing“that
he had been forced to serv e as a guard” and denying “any personal
inv olv ement in the atrocities committed at the camp.”288
The Supreme Court acknowledged that it had created two lines of
precedent “that may, at first blush, appear to point in different directions.”289 The first line, the Court said, “recognized that the right to
acquire American citizenship is a precious one and that once citizen-
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Id.
See id. (holding that the gov ernment “carries a heav y burden of proof in a
proceeding to div est a naturalized citizen of his citizenship” (quoting Costello v . United
States, 365 U.S. 265, 269 (1961))).
292 Id.
293 See id. at 507 (finding that Fedorenko falls within the statutory prohibition against
makinga willful misrepresentation to gain admission into the United States).
294 Id. at 506.
295 Id. at 518.
296 See Abbe L. Dienstag, Comment, Fedorenko v . United States: War Crimes, the
Defense of Duress, and American Nationality Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 120, 131 (1982)
(“[T]he inherent unsettledness of the duress issue and the combination of war-crime and
nationality-law factors present in Fedorenko call for careful and considered ev aluation of
the av ailability here of the duress defense. The Court, howev er, did not address itself to
these concerns.”).
297 See id. at 129 n.34 (noting that neither party argued the issue of statutory
interpretation).
298 485 U.S. 759 (1988).
291
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ship has been acquired, its loss can hav e sev ere and unsettlingconsequences.”290 Thus, denaturalization was required to meet a high
burden of proof.291
But the other line, the Court said, “recognized that there must be
strict compliance with all the congressionally imposed prerequisites to
the acquisition of citizenship.”292 This line of precedent, in the Court’s
v iew, required it to uphold Fedorenko’s loss of citizenship based on
his misrepresentations ev en assuming that his work as a guard
resulted from inv oluntary forced labor.293 Under this v ery formalist
approach, the Court deferred to Congress, “acknowledg[ing] . . . the
fact that Congress alone has the constitutional authority to prescribe
rules for naturalization,” and that the Court’s role is to “assure compliance” with its ex ercise of that role.294 Because Fedorenko’s concealment allowed him to gain an immigration status he would not
otherwise hav e qualified for, he had “illegally procured” citizenship
and it must be rev oked.295 Because the Court held that strict compliance with the statute required denaturalization regardless of duress,
the Court did not reach the larger question of legal complicity.296 One
commenter writingshortly after the decision was rendered described
the Fedorenko reasoning as “unex pected” and the opinion as a
“totally mechanical ex ercise” of statutory interpretation.297
Sev en years later, the Supreme Court applied a similarly formalist analysis in the denaturalization case of Kungys v. United States,
which inv olv ed an alleged guard at a Lithuanian concentration camp,
whose purported actions came to light only when the Sov iet Union
released v ideotaped depositions implicating Kungys.298 Kungys was
authored by Justice Antonin Scalia relativ ely early in his tenure on the
Court, and it showcased the tex tualist approach he would become
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299 See Michael Heyman, Language and Silence: The Supreme Court’s Search for the
Meaning of American Denaturalization Law, 5 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 409, 421 (1991) (noting
that the opinion was authored by “Antonin Scalia, a new member of the Court and a major
proponent of the tex tual approach to statutory interpretation”).
300 Id. at 431.
301 Kungys, 485 U.S. at 764.
302 Id. at 764–65.
303 See id. at 767 (noting that Kungys had conceded the other relev ant considerations
pertinent to a statutory v iolation).
304 Id. at 770 (quotingWeinstock v . United States, 231 F.2d 699, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1956)).
305 For ex ample, lying about the town where one was born could be an attempt to
conceal other potentially disqualifying information—such as a criminal history in that
town, or participation in wartime atrocities. See id. at 774 (“[T]he misrepresentation of
[date and place of birth] would . . . be a misrepresentation of material facts, if the true date
and place of birth would predictably hav e disclosed other facts relev ant to his
qualifications.”).
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known for.299 Justice Scalia’s opinion was partly a majority opinion
and partly a plurality opinion, as the Court yet again fractured in
deciding a denaturalization case. This time, howev er, the fracturing
did not rev eal a fundamental disagreement about the nature of citizenship; instead, the disagreement centered on relativ ely minor matters of tex tual interpretation. In the words of one scholar, “The
Kungys court [sic], confused and fragmented, finally settled on an odd
approach to the problems of the statute and achiev ed little . . . .
Rather than furthering v alues and larger legislativ e purposes, the
Court wrestled with language until it lost.”300
In the opinion, the Court accepted the findingof the courts below
that there was insufficient ev idence that Kungys had personally been
inv olv ed in ex ecutingLithuanian citizens; the district court had found
the Sov iet-era depositions to be “inherently unreliable.”301 Howev er,
the ev idence did show that Kungys had misrepresented his date and
place of birth, as well as his wartime occupation and residence.302 The
central question before the Court, then, was whether Kungys’s misrepresentations were material to his naturalization.303 On this point, a
majority of the Court agreed that a misrepresentation was material if
it had a “‘natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing,
the decision of’ the decisionmaking body to which it was
addressed.”304 Thus, ev en a relativ ely minor lie, such as a misstatement about the town of one’s birth, could be material if it influenced
the naturalization decision.305
Justice Scalia went on to conclude, in a part of the opinion that
garnered only four v otes, that Kungys’s misrepresentation of his birth
information had not been shown to be material; whether other misrepresentations might hav e been material would hav e to be deter-
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306 See id. at 776 (holdingthat the gov ernment failed to prov e materiality on Kungys’s
date and place of birth and remandingfor other materiality determinations).
307 See id. (notingthat Justice Stev ens’s concurringopinion would impose a materiality
requirement on this point).
308 See id. at 780 (“Literally read, [the statute] denominates a person to be of bad moral
character on account of hav ing giv en false testimony if he has told ev en the most
immaterial of lies . . . .”).
309 Id. at 782.
310 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1923 (2017).
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 Id.
314 Id.
315 Id.
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mined on remand.306 On the second ground for denaturalization—
that Kungys’s misrepresentations amounted to false testimony demonstratingthat he lacked the moral character required for naturalization,
and thus illegally “procured” it—the plurality agreed that no materiality requirement was necessary.307 Ev en a lie that did not itself affect
the naturalization decision could demonstrate a lack of moral character, if it was considered “testimony.”308 This point, howev er, would
also be remanded—this time for the lower court to determine whether
Kungys’s misrepresentations (essentially, false statements contained
on application forms) amounted to “testimony” as required by the
immigration statute.309
It was not until 2017 that the Supreme Court accepted another
denaturalization case. Maslenjak v. United States was one of the rarer
criminal prosecutions for naturalization fraud.310 Div na Maslenjak, an
ethnic Serb who resided in Bosnia during the civ il war of the 1990s,
came to the United States as a refugee and gained citizenship in
2007.311 As a refugee, Maslenjak had testified under oath that her husband had spent the war years secreted away, ev ading military serv ice.312 And when she sought naturalization, Maslenjak stated that she
had nev er giv en “‘false or misleading information’ to a gov ernment
official while applying for an immigration benefit.”313 In fact, howev er, Maslenjak knew all alongthat her husband had actually serv ed
in the Bosnian Serb Army, in a brigade that had participated in the
Srebrenica massacre.314 Maslenjak was charged with immigration
fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a), for knowingly procuring, contrary to
law, her own naturalization.315 Both the district court and the court of
appeals accepted the prosecutors’ interpretation that the statute did
not require any showingof materiality—the courts held that the conv iction could be sustained by ev idence of an intentional misrepresen-
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316 See id. at 1924 (noting that the lower courts would hav e found a v iolation
“irrespectiv e” of whether those false statements had any impact on her citizenship
determination).
317 See id. at 1925 (noting that a materiality requirement would be required by the
natural readingof the statute).
318 Id. at 1924.
319 Id. at 1925.
320 See id. at 1930–31 (holdingthat the jury needed to find more than an unlawful false
statement).
321 See id. at 1931 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (ex plaining that the question before the
Court was simply the materiality requirement, not what the causation inquiry should
require).
322 See id. at 1931 (Alito, J., concurring) (suggestingthat materiality “does not require
proof that a false statement actually had some effect on the naturalization decision”).
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tation in the naturalization process, regardless of whether that
misrepresentation contributed to the naturalization determination.316
Once again, the Supreme Court hewed to a tex tualist analysis in
its rev iew of those decisions. In a unanimous opinion authored by
Justice Kagan, the Court concluded that the statute’s language—
requiring that an indiv idual “procure” nationalization “contrary to
law”—impliedly contains a materiality element.317 The Court began
with the dictionary definition of “procure,” and analyzed its use in
ordinary speech.318 It concluded that the prosecutors’ position “falters
on the way language naturally works,” and held that materiality was
implied by the language of the statute.319 The Court then concluded
that, on remand, the jury should be asked to consider what impact
Maslenjak’s false statement had on the ultimate naturalization
decision.320
In Maslenjak, unlike many of the earlier cases, the Court was relativ ely unified. The Court unanimously agreed on the necessity of a
“materiality” finding. Justice Gorsuch joined all but Section II.B of
the Court’s opinion. He issued a concurrence, joined by Justice
Thomas, writingthat he would go no further than statingthe need to
instruct the jury regardingmateriality on remand, preferringto leav e
the specifics of that instruction to the lower courts.321 Justice Alito
filed a separate concurrence, arguingthat a statement could be material ev en if it did not ultimately affect the final denaturalization decision, offeringan ex ample of a defendant who believ es that his or her
false statement would procure naturalization—ev en if that statement
did not actually influence the final decision.322
Only after basingits rulingon the tex t itself did the Court raise
the “disquieting consequences” of the prosecution’s position—if the
interpretation were otherwise, prosecutors would hav e “nearly limitless lev erage” and new citizens would hav e “precious little security,”
as nearly ev ery immigrant would hav e a misstatement, howev er
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minor, in their application.323 The application, after all, asks “Hav e
you EVER committed . . . a crime or offense for which you were NOT
arrested?”324 At oral argument, this question clearly troubled the
Justices, as it would seem to allow the denaturalization of anyone who
failed to report each and ev ery instance in which they ex ceeded the
speed limit without beingpulled ov er.325 Interestingly, the discussion
of this issue was contained within the part of the opinion joined by all
nine Justices, suggesting that the Court unanimously agreed that
undermining the security of naturalized citizens would raise grav e
constitutional concerns.
But it is just this concern that is now reflected in the Borgoño
case. Her denaturalization is sought on the basis of an alleged crime
for which she had not been arrested at the time of her naturalization
application.326 That crime—looking the other way and continuing to
prov ide ordinary administrativ e support while her boss was engaged
in financial wrongdoing—is likely one that many people in a financially v ulnerable position would commit, howev er, makingit harder to
argue that her actions demonstrate moral turpitude sufficient to disqualify her from citizenship. Especially giv en the tight connection
between employment and health insurance, ev en persons of high
moral character might find it difficult to risk losingtheir job by taking
a stand against their employer’s fraud.
THE PROBLEM

WITH

IV
CIVIL DENATURALIZATION

323

05/14/2019 08:58:42

Id. at 1927.
Id.
325 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 53, Maslenjak v . United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918
(2017) (No. 16-309) (suggestingat oral argument that a “serious constitutional question” is
raised when an American citizen can “hav e his citizenship taken away because 40 years
before, he did not deliberately put on paper what his nickname was or what . . . his
speeding record was 30 years before that, which was, in fact, totally immaterial,” and
askingrhetorically, “That’s not a constitutional question?” (statement of Breyer, J.)).
326 Complaint, supra note 86, at 5, para. 20 (notingthat Borgoño applied to become a
citizen while still engaged in the alleged criminal activ ity).
324
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It is understandable that after its sweepingconstitutional holding
in Afroyim, the Supreme Court would turn to a narrower formalism in
later cases. After all, the holding in Afroyim stood on shaky ground
after the decision, and there was v alid concern that a new appointment to the Court would swingthe pendulum back toward the Court’s
prev ious holding in Perez. Focusing more narrowly on tex tual interpretation allowed the Court to maintain the broader constitutional
holdingov er the nex t fifty years and come to agreement in the cases
that followed.
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And for the subsequent half-century, the Court’s narrower
approach did little or no harm to the civ il and political rights of naturalized citizens. The number of attempted denaturalizations declined
dramatically, as a consequence of both the heightened constitutional
protection and a rapid decline in the Red Scare.327 Not only was
Communism seen as less of a threat to the United States’ interests, but
a respect for civ il liberties, freedom of thought, and equal treatment
was v iewed as the antidote to totalitarian regimes.328 American public
discourse presented civ il liberties—and the due process protections
backing them up—as essential aspects of what it means to be
American.329
The few denaturalizations of alleged Nazi concentration-camp
guards and other war criminals during the fifty years between 1967
and 2017 did little to disrupt an ov erall sense of citizenship security.
The American political identity may be complex and v ariegated, but
the ethos of “Nev er Again” meant that it included no room for those
who supported the atrocities perpetrated by the Nazi regime.330
Ex cludingsuch indiv iduals from the body politic comported with the
original approach of President Taft’s Attorney General, George W.
Wickersham, who ordered U.S. Attorneys to refrain from indiscriminately filingdenaturalization proceedings against ev ery single citizen
for whom naturalization was alleged “to hav e been fraudulently or
illegally procured unless some substantial results are to be achiev ed
thereby in the way of betterment of the citizenship of the country.”331
By the same token, it sent a message that those who sought refuge
41254-nyu_94-3 Sheet No. 72 Side A
05/14/2019 08:58:42

327 See WEIL, supra note 110, at 179 (notingthat denaturalizations declined rapidly post1968).
328 See Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal Courts: An Essay in
Honor of Henry Monaghan, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579, 634 (2010) (“The effects of World
War II and the Cold War influenced the ex pansion of criminal defendants’ rights between
the 1940s and the 1960s, as judges sought to distinguish the treatment accorded by the
United States from that of totalitarian countries.”).
329 See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Due Process in the American Identity, 64 ALA. L.
REV. 255, 262 (2012) (“In the American mind, judicial process is not merely a means by
which we resolv e indiv idual disputes; instead, it is a mechanism by which we ‘announce to
the world something about our beliefs and v alues and our sense of ourselv es and our
society.’” (quotingRobert N. Strassfeld, Responses to Ten Questions, 37 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 5133, 5148 (2011))).
330 See ALLAN A. RYAN, JR., QUIET NEIGHBORS: PROSECUTING NAZI WAR CRIMINALS
IN AMERICA 340 (1984) (“By rev okingcitizenship, the polity—the American people joined
together in a society and a gov ernment—takes the most solemn and drastic step av ailable
to it: the civ il equiv alent of ex communication.”); Francine J. Lipman, Bearing Witness to
Economic Injustices of Undocumented Immigrant Families: A New Class of “Undeserving”
Poor, 7 NEV. L.J. 736, 738 (2007) (“Surv iv ors of the Holocaust speak loudly and uniformly
of one commandment: Nev er again: bear witness to injustice, racism, and hate and do what
is necessary to prev ent them.”).
331 WEIL, supra note 110, at 28.
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from the Nazis in the United States were truly American, and would
be protected from those who had once persecuted them. As a result,
programs seeking to identify and denaturalize former war criminals
enjoyed broad support from the American public. Difficult questions
about the constitutionality of those programs could therefore go
unresolv ed.
But with the return of aggressiv e denaturalization programs,
questions of constitutional legitimacy require an answer. The two
cases discussed abov e, inv olv ingBaljinder Singh and Norma Borgoño,
ex emplify some of the procedural and substantiv e shortcomings we
discuss in this section. The courts in those cases hav e not yet had a
chance to directly grapple with the questions we raise below. As of
this writing, Borgoño’s denaturalization case has not yet been heard,
and Singh’s was decided on summary judgment without the benefit of
an adv ersarial proceeding. These two cases are just the tip of the iceberg in the gov ernment’s plan to ramp up denaturalization actions,
howev er; the Justice Department has “stated its intention to refer
approx imately an additional 1600 [cases] for prosecution.”332 This
action would be more than a ten-fold increase ov er the fewer than 150
attempted ov er the last fifty years.333 As more cases are litigated,
these are questions that courts will need to confront.
A. The Procedural Due Process Deficiencies of Civil
Denaturalization

05/14/2019 08:58:42

332 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department
Secures First Denaturalization as a Result of Operation Janus (Jan. 9, 2018), https://
www.justice.gov /opa/pr/justice-department-secures-first-denaturalization-result-operationjanus.
333 See WEIL, supra note 110, at 179–80 (noting that since 1968, fewer than 150
denaturalizations hav e been attempted and fewer than a half-dozen hav e actually been
imposed).
334 See Schneiderman v . United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122 (1943) (requiring“the clearest
sort of justification and proof” to take away citizenship); id. at 160 (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (“A denaturalization suit is not a criminal proceeding. But neither is it an
ordinary civ il action since it inv olv es an important adjudication of status.”).
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One of the most glaringconstitutional weaknesses of civ il denaturalization was identified by the Supreme Court back in 1943: the lack
of procedural due process in ordinary civ il litigation.334 The return of
denaturalization as a political priority brings the issue of due process
to the forefront. In 2018, a man was stripped of citizenship without
beingpersonally serv ed with process, without makingan appearance
in the case either personally or through an attorney, and without benefitingfrom ev en a contested hearingat the summary judgment stage.
He may not, ev en today, know that he has lost his citizenship rights.
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335 See Klapprott v . United States, 335 U.S. 601, 602, 616 (1949) (settingaside a default
judgment of denaturalization); supra Part III.
336 Klapprott, 335 U.S. at 612–13 (stating that “additional procedural safeguards” may
be required, but at a minimum, the gov ernment must adhere to the heightened standard of
proof “ev en in cases where the defendant has made default in appearance”).
337 See supra Part III.
338 Klapprott, 335 U.S. at 616 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
339 Id.
340 Id. at 616–17.
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Ev en if nothing in the case v iolated the Federal Rules of Civ il
Procedure, the proceedings nev ertheless giv e rise to serious questions
of procedural due process.
As discussed abov e, the Supreme Court added some heightened
procedural protections beyond what is ordinarily av ailable in civ il litigation: The Court required a heightened burden of proof and ov erturned a denaturalization obtained by the defendant’s inv oluntary
default.335 The Court’s language suggested that the risk of losingcitizenship was serious enough to warrant heightened procedure; it
required the gov ernment to meet a burden “substantially identical
with that required in criminal cases,” and asked that this lev el of proof
be met ev en in cases where the defendant did not make an
appearance.336
Not all of the Justices agreed that the heightened procedure was
constitutionally required—but some did, including most notably
Justice Rutledge.337 Justice Rutledge’s concurrence in Klapprott
emphasized that ordinary civ il litigation was insufficient to protect
against the erroneous depriv ation of citizenship.338 Treatinga denaturalization suit “as if it were nothingmore than a suit for damages for
breach of contract or one to recov er ov ertime pay,” he argued,
“ignores . . . ev ery consideration of justice and of reality concerning
the substance of the suit and what is at stake.”339 He referred to the
right of citizenship as “this most comprehensiv e and basic right of all,”
arguingthat it should not be subject to “the dev ice or label of a civ il
suit, carried forward with none of the safeguards of criminal procedure prov ided by the Bill of Rights.”340
More than half a century has passed since Justice Rutledge suggested that ordinary civ il litigation could not offer the constitutionally
required lev el of procedural due process to defendants at risk of losing
their citizenship. In the interv eningdecades, the Court has refined the
doctrine of procedural due process. The Court’s modern doctrinal
dev elopments do not cast doubt on Justice Rutledge’s earlier concerns. Instead, they go further, supportingthe notion that civ il litigation is utterly inadequate to protect the defendant’s liberty interest in
citizenship.
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341 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); Irina D. Manta & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Secret
Jurisdiction, 65 EMORY L.J. 1313, 1331 (2016) (notingthat the balancingtest applied today
is the one articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge).
342 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348.
343 Manta & Robertson, supra note 341, at 1331.
344 Id.
345 See Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86 IND. L.J.
1289, 1349 (2011) (“[I]n the turn toward the politics of univ ersalism, somethingchanged:
v otingbecame a fundamental right of citizens, closely tied to citizenship itself, that could
only be denied or abridged by the state with compelling reason.”); Patrick Weil,
Citizenship, Passports, and the Legal Identity of Americans: Edward Snowden and Others
Have a Case in the Courts, 123 YALE L.J. F. 565, 576 (2014) (referringto passports as “the
ultimate and definitiv e proof of citizenship and identity under international law”).
346 See Should I Consider U.S. Citizenship?, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://
www.uscis.gov /citizenship/learners/should-i-consider-us-citizenship (last v isited Jan. 8,
2019) (listingbenefits of United States citizenship).
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The Supreme Court’s current approach to procedural due process
was adopted in Mathews v. Eldridge.341 The Eldridge case noted that
the “essence of due process” is the requirement of notice and opportunity to be heard.342 Beyond that, it applied “what is in essence a
cost-benefit analysis, weighingthe risk that the plaintiff will be erroneously depriv ed of liberty against the cost of prov idingadditional procedures to safeguard against such error.”343 The court must weigh
both the indiv idual’s liberty interest in the outcome of the case and
the gov ernment’s administrativ e burden in prov idingheightened procedure, and the court must ev aluate whether adoptingsuch a heightened procedure would offer significant protection against the
“erroneous depriv ation” of the defendant’s rights.344
Under this standard, a court deciding a denaturalization case
would therefore hav e to look at three factors. First, what is the indiv idual’s interest in retainingcitizenship? Second, what kind of a cost
or administrativ e burden would it create to offer the defendant additional procedural protections? And finally, how much protection
would those procedures actually offer—that is, to what ex tent could
we rely on those procedures to protect against the erroneous depriv ation of the defendant’s citizenship rights?
Ev en on a purely indiv idual and instrumentalist lev el, the right to
citizenship is an important one. Citizenship carries with it the right to
v ote in elections and the right to carry a passport that allows for international trav el.345 Citizenship also allows indiv iduals to qualify for
employment in some gov ernment jobs, allows indiv iduals to run for
office if they so desire, and makes it easier for people to bring relativ es to the United States.346
But the most important aspects of citizenship transcend the
merely instrumental. To Chief Justice Warren, citizenship was not just
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347 See Perez v . Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64–65 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)
(“Citizenship is man’s basic right for it is nothingless than the right to hav e rights.”).
348 See, e.g., Vance v . Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 266 (1980) (“[E]x patriation proceedings are
civ il in nature and do not threaten a loss of liberty.”).
349 Knauer v . United States, 328 U.S. 654, 659 (1946) (quotingNgFungHo v . White, 259
U.S. 276, 284 (1922)).
350 See supra notes 330–34 and accompanyingtex t.
351 See Fishkin, supra note 345, at 1333–56 (discussingthe connection of v otingrights to
dignity, equality, and citizenship and ex plaininghow v otingrights, through the assurance
of political participation, help to preserv e all other rights).
352 See Jonathan Dav id Shaub, Expatriation Restored, 55 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363, 423
(2018) (“Today, citizenship may be better conceiv ed of as the right to participate in the
state as a component of its sov ereignty, than the right to hav e rights.”).

41254-nyu_94-3 Sheet No. 74 Side A

fundamental—it was the most fundamental right from which all the
others were deriv ed.347 It is true that the Supreme Court has been
inconsistent in its characterization of the citizenship right, with
Justices sometimes suggesting that the depriv ation of citizenship
causes no real harm to the indiv idual, who may still go about his or
her life without obv ious disruption,348 while other times recognizing
that the loss of citizenship threatens to “result in the loss ‘of all that
makes life worth liv ing.’ ”349 But as discussed abov e, citizenship is
about much more than civ ic duties ex ercised on an occasional basis,
such as v otingor serv ingon a jury; instead, citizenship goes to the v ery
heart of membership in the political polity.350 Citizenship encapsulates
a right to belong, a right to participate in the political life of the
country, and a right to feel secure in one’s national identity.351
Whether citizenship is seen as the “right to hav e rights,” or whether it
is v iewed more narrowly as a right to participate in the ex ercise of
sov ereign authority,352 its central place in American history cannot be
ignored. The country, after all, was founded on the ideal of citizens’
ex ercise of sov ereign authority. Can civ il litigation offer adequate protection for those rights? Certainly, the Supreme Court in
Schneiderman and Klaprott thought that at the v ery least, certain procedures would need to be modified; those cases required a heightened
burden of proof and disallowed a default judgment to be granted
without an ev identiary hearing. Howev er, current cases show that
ev en these protections are not enough. A summary judgment, entered
after the gov ernment’s affidav its are simply taken as true, does not
offer significantly more protection than the default judgment in
Klapprott. The Singh case demonstrates the problem: The gov ernment
enters into ev idence an affidav it statingthat Singh’s failure to show up
for an asylum hearing more than twenty years ago was a result of
intentional fraud. If taken as true, as it was in the one-sided hearing,
then the statement meets the “clear and conv incing” standard. But to
observ ers outside the courtroom, not bound to accept the gov ern-
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Bianco et al., supra note 10, at 8.
Gideon v . Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“The right of one charged with
crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some
countries, but it is in ours.”).
355 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; to hav e compulsory process for obtainingwitnesses in his fav or,
and to hav e the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”).
354
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ment’s statement as true, that conclusion does not lend itself to confidence. What motiv e would Singh hav e had to lie about his name,
when he had nev er been denied asylum on the merits, and no factual
findings had been made as to his particular case?
At an adv ersarial hearing, that question could hav e been asked.
Perhaps the answer would hav e pointed toward immigration fraud;
perhaps it might hav e suggested a more innocent ex planation. But
under the current procedures in play, we hav e no way of knowing. Did
Singh know that he had been sued? If so, was he unable to afford an
attorney to represent him? Does he know, ev en now, that a judgment
of denaturalization has been entered against him? Could he hav e had
a factual defense to the suit against him? Without answers to these
questions, it is difficult to hav e confidence in the outcome of the case.
An adv ersarial hearing, with both parties represented by counsel,
would go a longway toward protectingagainst the erroneous depriv ation of citizenship rights. Attorneys prosecuting such cases hav e
admitted as much. By identifying the “benefits” of pursuing a civ il
case rather than filingcharges—includingthe lack of a jury trial, the
av ailability of summary judgment, and the absence of any right to
counsel—they admit that these procedural features facilitate
obtainingdenaturalization.353 The procedural protections offered in a
criminal action make denaturalization more difficult to achiev e—and
therefore do more to protect against the erroneous depriv ation of
citizenship.
Eliminatingciv il denaturalization admittedly comes with costs—
financial, administrativ e, and systemic. The financial and administrativ e costs arise from handling denaturalization through immigrationfraud proceedings in the criminal justice system, rather than through
civ il litigation. Naturalization fraud is a felony, and it has been more
than fifty years since the Supreme Court held that due process
requires an attorney to be appointed in felony cases for indiv iduals
unable to afford counsel on their own.354 Constitutionally guaranteed
criminal procedure likewise ensures that defendants hav e actual
notice of the proceedings against them, includingthe right to confront
witnesses.355 And unlike the law for civ il denaturalization, the
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356 See 18 U.S.C. § 1425 (2012) (defining unlawful naturalization); 18 U.S.C. § 3291
(2012) (prescribinga ten-year statute of limitations).
357 Schneiderman v . United States, 320 U.S. 118, 154 (1943).
358 See supra Section I.A.1.
359 See WEIL, supra note 110, at 27–28.
360 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 357 (1871) (“[B]etter that ten
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immigration-fraud enactment carries a statute of limitations; cases
may not be brought after more than ten years after the fact.356
Applyingthese heightened procedures means that each denaturalization case will cost more to prosecute; the cost of counsel, and the cost
of trial proceedings, will be greater than the cost of a summary judgment hearingin which only the gov ernment appears.
Ev en if the cost of each proceedingis higher, it is likely that the
financial costs will be offset by a lower total number of prosecutions.
The statute of limitations in naturalization-fraud cases means that
some number of cases will not be prosecutable. And though the
Supreme Court has applied a heightened burden of proof in denaturalization cases, that heightened burden has been interpreted as
requiring “clear, unequiv ocal, and conv incing” ev idence,357 which is
still a lower burden than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Taking
these factors together, it is likely that significantly fewer cases could
successfully be prosecuted—especially from Operation Janus, which
looks back well beyond the ten-year statute of limitations.358 If fewer
cases are subject to prosecution, then a reduction in the number of
v iable cases could offset the increased cost of prov idingenhanced procedural protections in the cases that remain. Fewer prosecutions, of
course, means that some people may “get away” with committingnaturalization fraud. But ev en Attorney General Wickersham realized
back in 1909 that many such cases of fraud were not worth pursuing,
especially when the indiv iduals offered no risk to the larger society.359
The elements of the due process analysis work together interdependently and therefore require balancing multiple factors. Establishing a right to counsel and a mandatory notice procedure, for
ex ample, means weighing the financial cost of prov iding these measures against the truth-finding benefits of the adv ersary process.
Applyinga heightened burden of proof and imposinga statute of limitations means weighing the risk of erroneous remov al of citizenship
against the risk of erroneous non-enforcement. Ev en the best justice
system must operate in hindsight; no trial can ensure perfectly accurate fact-finding. In balancingthese risks, American courts hav e generally thought that “it is far worse to conv ict an innocent man than to
let a guilty man go free.”360 If the citizenship interest is central to the
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nation’s foundation and identity—and this Article argues that it
is361—then both the financial costs and the risk that an occasional
indiv idual might wrongfully gain and keep citizenship are a small price
to pay to av oid unjustly strippingcitizenship from others.
B. Beyond Procedure: The Constitutional Infirmities of Civil
Denaturalization

05/14/2019 08:58:42

guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”); Alex ander Volokh, n Guilty Men,
146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 198–206 (1997) (collectingcases and ex ploringthe different courts’
formulations for how to weigh the wrongful acquittal of the guilty against the wrongful
conv iction of the innocent).
361 See infra Section IV.C.
362 Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1501 (1999).
363 See Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 1013, 1019 (2008) (describingthe “elusiv e relationship” between the two as “one of
the recurringand unresolv ed debates in legal theory”).
364 See Obergefell v . Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–03 (2015) (“The Due Process Clause
and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way, though they set forth
independent principles.”).
365 See supra Section III.C.
366 See United States v . Kairys, 782 F.2d 1374, 1383 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Schneider and
Afroyim do stand for the propositions that naturalized and nativ e citizens must be treated
equally and that before any citizen can be ex patriated or denaturalized there must be a
v oluntary and intentional act.”); supra notes 227–46 and accompanyingtex t.

41254-nyu_94-3 Sheet No. 75 Side B

The centrality and importance of the underlyingcitizenship right
ex tends beyond procedural due process. While procedural due process
“asks whether the gov ernment has followed the proper procedures
when it takes away life, liberty or property,” courts look to the doctrine of substantiv e due process to determine “whether there is a sufficient substantiv e justification, a good enough reason for such a
depriv ation.”362 Of course, these matters are closely related; just as
the substantiv e v alue of the underlying liberty interest must be
weighed in the procedural due process analysis, so, too, are the av ailability and adequacy of procedural protections considered in a substantiv e due process analysis.363 And, of course, substantiv e due process
also interacts with other constitutional protections364—which for
denaturalization necessarily includes the Citizenship Clause.365 Again,
howev er, civ il denaturalization falls far short of constitutional
protections.
The Supreme Court’s precedent in Afroyim and Schneider may
be enough to find civ il denaturalization unconstitutional. Those decisions, after all, warn against applying different standards to naturalized citizens and those born in the United States.366 But
denaturalization for fraud and illegal procurement is applicable only
to naturalized citizens, not to those born in the United States—the
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367 Schneider v . Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168–69 (1964). But see Kairys, 782 F.2d at 1383
(“[T]his standard applies only to acts committed after citizenship. Because there are no
analogous pre-citizenship requirements for nativ e-born indiv iduals, naturalized citizens are
not beingtreated any differently than their intrinsic differences require.”).
368 Schneider, 377 U.S. at 169.
369 Afroyim v . Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267 n.23 (1967).
370 Id. at 268.
371 See supra note 35 (notingthat Operation Janus focuses on what the U.S. gov ernment
has termed “special interest countries” based on national security concerns).
372 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
373 Chemerinsky, supra note 362, at 1501.
374 Sandefur, supra note 32, at 297–98 (citingSHIRLEY JACKSON, THE LOTTERY (1949),
reprinted in SHIRLEY JACKSON: NOVELS AND STORIES 227–35 (Joyce Carol Oates ed.,
2010)); see also Manta & Robertson, supra note 341, at 1341.
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v ery dichotomy that the Schneider Court ruled impermissible when it
held that Congress could not denaturalize citizens for liv ingabroad in
the country of their birth, because such a requirement by its nature
could not apply to nativ e-born U.S. citizens.367 The Schneider Court
warned that such distinctions risk creating“a second-class citizenship”
that discriminates against naturalized citizens.368
The Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship clause that supported
the holding in Afroyim likewise suggests that Congress lacks the
power to take away citizenship once it is granted. While it is true that
the Afroyim Court specifically ex cluded cases of fraud and illegal procurement,369 the opinion’s logic cov ers the situations we see today.
The underlyingconcern of Afroyim was that denaturalization could be
wielded as a political weapon—that “a group of citizens temporarily in
office can depriv e another group of citizens of their citizenship.”370
And yet that is ex actly what we see with Operation Janus and the
proposed denaturalization task force: Current political ex pediency
supports looking back through the files of indiv iduals naturalized
years or decades ago, and, in particular, prioritizing the files of indiv iduals from countries associated with the current popular fears and
anx ieties.371
The Supreme Court’s post-1967 dev elopment of substantiv e due
process and equal protection in cases outside of the denaturalization
contex t strengthens this conclusion. Substantiv e due process is
grounded in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which forbid
depriv inga person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.”372 The doctrine asks whether particular restrictions on liberty
are constitutionally v alid—that is, whether there is “a sufficient substantiv e justification” for that depriv ation of liberty.373 It protects
against the arbitrary loss of fundamental rights. Scholar Timothy
Sandefur has used Shirley Jackson’s short story The Lottery to illustrate the idea of substantiv e due process.374 In the story, v illagers must
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choose a member to undergo what the reader later learns is a death by
stoning.375 The v illagers make their choice of indiv idual through a procedure that is scrupulously fair, ensuring that each v illager has the
same chance to be chosen at random—but the horror of the story is
the utter arbitrariness of the ultimate fate. In Sandefur’s words, the
story illustrates a “fundamentally arbitrary, yet regular procedure.”376
The essential protection of substantiv e due process is the protection of
the underlyingright. Ev en equitable procedures can v iolate due process if they arbitrarily depriv e indiv iduals of a fundamental right.
The Supreme Court’s most recently articulated the substantiv e
due process test in Obergefell v. Hodges, which held that states could
not restrict the right to same-sex marriage.377 In Obergefell, the Court
noted that the first question is whether the liberty at issue can be characterized as a fundamental right.378 In determiningwhether a right is
truly fundamental, the Court must consider “central reference to specific historical practices.”379 Citizenship, as the foundation of v oting
and political participation—which are “preserv ativ e of all rights”380—
has the requisite importance and historical pedigree to qualify as a
fundamental right.
The depriv ation of a fundamental right requires a compelling
state interest.381 Civ il denaturalization fails that test. In contrast to the
central role that citizenship has played ov er the nation’s history, ex patriation and denaturalization hav e played only supportingroles, with
the passage of time throwingthem into significant disfav or.382 For the
first century of American life, citizenship rev ocation was a rarity in
the political process.383 Although its use grew in the early part of the

05/14/2019 08:58:42

JACKSON, supra note 374.
Sandefur, supra note 32, at 297.
377 See Obergefell v . Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (“The right of same-sex
couples to marry that is part of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is
deriv ed, too, from that Amendment’s guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.”).
378 Id. at 2598.
379 Id. at 2602.
380 Yick Wo v . Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (“Though not regarded strictly as a
natural right, but as a priv ilege merely conceded by society, according to its will, under
certain conditions, nev ertheless [v oting] is regarded as a fundamental political right,
because preserv ativ e of all rights.”); see Kim, supra note 162, at 1466–70 (2001)
(summarizing precedent that “[c]itizenship, once attained, constitutes a fundamental
right”).
381 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2616 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The theory is that
some liberties are ‘so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental,’ and therefore cannot be depriv ed without compelling justification.”
(quotingSnyder v . Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934))).
382 See supra Part II.
383 See supra Section II.A.
376
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See supra Sections II.B, II.C.
See supra Section II.D.
386 See Fedorenko v . United States, 449 U.S. 490, 518 (1981) (“An alien who seeks
political rights as a member of this Nation can rightfully obtain them only upon the terms
and conditions specified by Congress. Courts are without authority to sanction changes or
modifications; their duty is rigidly to enforce the legislativ e will in respect of a matter so
v ital to the public welfare.” (quoting United States v . Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472, 474–75
(1917))).
387 See, e.g., Rainer Bauböck & Vesco Paskalev , Cutting Genuine Links: A Normative
Analysis of Citizenship Deprivation, 30 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47, 80 (2015) (arguingthat civ il
citizenship law requires its own sanctions to deter cheating).
388 WEIL, supra note 110, at 56.
389 See, e.g., Spiro, supra note 167, at 2171 (“As those hostile to the United States retain
their citizenship, citizenship will no longer demarcate the boundary between friends and
enemies.”).
390 See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 864 (2006) (“Substantiv e due process
cases, which make up the majority of strict scrutiny applications in the fundamental rights
area, surv iv e at a rate (22%) consistent with strict scrutiny more generally.”).
385
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twentieth century,384 rev ocation had largely receded by the latter part
of that century.385 It is hard to imagine a compellingneed for a process that is so little used—and, at the same time, so susceptible to the
political winds.
That is not to say that there is no state interest in civ il denaturalization. First, the Supreme Court has noted the importance of protecting Congress’s constitutional power to set naturalization
requirements; if citizens failing to meet Congress’s stated requirements are naturalized nonetheless, then that action would usurp
Congress’s power.386 Second, some hav e emphasized the importance
of deterringimmigration fraud.387 If naturalization is irrev ocable, then
perhaps indiv iduals will believ e that they hav e nothing to lose by
engagingin fraudulent conduct. Finally, and perhaps most controv ersially, some hav e identified an interest in protectingthe nation’s political fabric against those who mean it harm. Duringthe early Cold War
era, that resulted in the attempted ex clusion of communists;388 in the
modern era, it has led to proposals to denaturalize indiv iduals with
ties to terrorism.389
None of these interests can withstand heightened scrutiny, howev er.390 First, protection of Congress’s naturalization power can be
accomplished on the front end with careful rev iew of the naturalization application through an administrativ e process that is likely both
less ex pensiv e and more systematic in rooting out potential fraud or
error. Likewise, whatev er disincentiv es to fraud the denaturalization
program might produce are likely v astly ov ershadowed by the incentiv es inherent in the system. Ev en without denaturalization, there are
tremendous incentiv es to av oid immigration fraud. Getting caught
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duringthe immigration or naturalization process means beingpermanently barred from the United States and potentially spendingtime in
prison for immigration fraud.391 If someone is foolish enough—or desperate enough—to be willing to risk those consequences, they are
unlikely to be deterred by the fear that they could be denaturalized
years or decades later. Finally, the state interest in protecting the
nation’s political fabric is likely serv ed through more narrowly
targeted procedures: pursuing criminal actions against actual and
attempted terrorist acts to ensure physical safety, while safeguarding
civ il liberties to allow the marketplace of political ideas to serv e the
nation’s interests. The lesson of McCarthyism during the Red Scare
was that the political fabric of the nation is strongest when political
ideas are freely ex pressed; tryingto suppress political disagreement is
itself a threat to the American identity and political fabric.392
C. Civil Denaturalization’s Threat to Constitutional Democracy

05/14/2019 08:58:42

391 INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(i) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (2012)); see also
Robert L. Reev es, Visa Fraud and Waivers, REEVES IMMIGR. L. GROUP, https://
www.rreev es.com/immigration-news/v isa-fraud-waiv ers (last v isited Jan. 10, 2019) (“A
findingof fraud under section 212(a)(6)(c) of the INA results in a lifetime bar for future
immigration benefits such as a green card and the ability to petition family unless granted a
waiv er.”).
392 See Masumi Izumi, Alienable Citizenship: Race, Loyalty and the Law in the Age of
‘American Concentration Camps,’ 1941–1971, 13 ASIAN AM. L.J. 1, 20 (2006) (notingthat
in the McCarthy era, freedom became a priv ilege only afforded to those the gov ernment
deemed loyal).
393 Perez v . Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64–65 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting), overruled in
part by Afroyim v . Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
394 Id. at 64 (quotingTHE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)).
395 Id.
396 Id. at 65 (“[T]he citizens themselv es are sov ereign, and their citizenship is not subject
to the general powers of their gov ernment.”).
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The Supreme Court’s failure to articulate a consistent theory of
citizenship leav es the Court’s denaturalization doctrine unmoored
from the constitutional foundations of democracy. Chief Justice
Warren articulated the connection between constitutional democracy
and citizenship in the middle of the century.393 Warren’s v iew deriv ed
from founding principles enshrined in the Declaration of
Independence: “Gov ernments are instituted among Men, deriv ing
their just powers from the consent of the gov erned.”394 Under this
conception, Warren argued, citizenship reflects the v ery “right to hav e
rights.”395 That is, it is not the state that creates the right of citizenship; instead, the citizens themselv es possess sov ereignty, delegating
to the state the “power to function as a sov ereignty” as part of the
social contract.396
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397 Shai Lav i, Punishment and the Revocation of Citizenship in the United Kingdom,
United States, and Israel, 13 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 404, 409–13 (2010).
398 Id. at 413–17.
399 Id. at 399.
400 See Bauböck & Paskalev , supra note 387, at 60–71.
401 Id. at 63.
402 Id. (emphasis added).
403 Liav Orgad, Creating New Americans: The Essence of Americanism Under the
Citizenship Test, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1227, 1295 (2011).
404 Id. at 1296.
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Although the Supreme Court has not continued to engage in discussion of citizenship theory, scholars of democratic process hav e
ex tended the conv ersation. Shai Lav i articulated three traditional theories of citizenship applied by countries around the world: citizenship
as security (that is, a state-granted right to permanently reside in a
territory, as in the United Kingdom),397 citizenship as a social contract
(founded on the consensual allegiance of the citizen, reflecting the
v iew of United States citizenship ex pressed by Chief Justice
Warren),398 and citizenship as an ethnonational bond (with Israel
presented as “the closest representativ e of this model”).399 Rainer
Bauböck and Vesco Paskalev ex panded further on this approach,
offering contrasting conceptions of the fundamental basis of citizenship.400 One is a state-directed approach in which citizenship is
founded on state discretion; under this v iew, “citizenship policies
should primarily serv e the goals of the State represented by a democratically legitimate gov ernment.”401 Another approach, howev er,
which historically held sway under the United States constitutional
order, v iews citizenship “as an indiv idual entitlement that is held
against the State . . . a foundation of indiv idual autonomy analogous
to indiv idual property that the State must protect and of which it
cannot depriv e its citizens without losinglegitimacy.”402
The idea of citizenship as part of a social compact that giv es rise
to an indiv idual right is wov en into the fabric of American democracy,
and is the only theory consistent with American constitutional structure. As one scholar has written, “Unlike Europe’s ethnic and cultural
nationalism, American nationalism is basically civ ic; the United States
is an idea-based nation.”403 Indiv iduals “willingto respect and accept”
the political tenets of our constitutional system were welcomed into
the American polity; it was the shared commitment to the
Constitution and to the political order that it represented that defined
a shared national identity.404 The polity was formed first, before the
state gained sov ereignty; and upon the nation’s founding, “[t]he
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
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U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Perez v . Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 65 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (“Whatev er . . .
the scope of its powers to regulate the conduct and affairs of all persons within its
jurisdiction, a gov ernment of the people cannot take away their citizenship simply because
one branch of that gov ernment can be said to hav e a conceiv ably rational basis for wanting
to do so.”), overruled in part by Afroyim v . Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
407 Cf. id. at 83–84 (“The Fourteenth Amendment grants citizenship to the nativ eborn . . . . I see no constitutional method by which it can be taken from him.”).
408 Kennedy v . Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 214 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
409 See WEIL, supra note 110, at 5 (“American citizens, naturalized and nativ e-born,
were redefined as possessingsov ereignty themselv es.”).
410 A LEXANDER M EIKLEJOHN , F REE S PEECH AND I TS R ELATION TO S ELF GOVERNMENT 6 (1948) (arguing that in a self-gov erning society, “[t]here is only one
group—the self-gov erning people. Rulers and ruled are the same indiv iduals”); id. at 11
(“We the People . . . make and administer law.”); id. at 15 (“We, and we alone, are the
rulers.”).
411 Afroyim v . Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967).
406
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prohibited by it to the States, [were] reserv ed to the States respectiv ely, or to the people.”405
Under Chief Justice Warren’s v iew of denaturalization, the state
therefore could not inv oluntarily denaturalize an indiv idual—especially not as a matter of ordinary legislativ e policy.406 After all, if the
state’s sov ereign power ex isted only as a delegation from its citizens,
then how could the state presume to take citizenship away?407 Such an
action would be a usurpation of power. Ultimately the v iew originally
ex pressed by Chief Justice Warren would persist. As Justice Stewart
stated in his dissent in Mendoza-Martinez, “the power to ex patriate
endows gov ernment with authority to define and to limit the society
which it represents and to which it is responsible.”408 As the Court
recognized in those cases, such a v iew does not comport with the constitutional framework of the United States.
Current denaturalization policies threaten the cohesion of a political structure founded on a sov ereign citizenry.409 In the United
States’ constitutional democracy, it is the status of citizenship that, in
Alex ander Meiklejohn’s words, establishes an indiv idual as both
“ruler” and “ruled”—and thereby prov ides the basis for political
freedom.410 The Supreme Court in Afroyim adopted a similar theory
of citizenship, stating that “[c]itizenship in this Nation is a part of a
cooperativ e affair. Its citizenry is the country and the country is its
citizenry.”411 Makingthe citizenship of naturalized citizens v ulnerable
to political winds changes the v ery character of that country—and that
is the effect of denaturalization, ev en when such policies are theoretically targeted at cases of immigration fraud or illegal procurement.
It is no answer to say that not all naturalized citizens will, or ev en
can, be so targeted. The problem is not the number of citizens subject
to denaturalization proceedings, but rather the arbitrariness of who is
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targeted—and the political message that is sent by that targeting.412
Combining selectiv e enforcement with race, religion, or national
origin—as with Operation Janus’s focus on “special interest countries,” for ex ample—giv es rise to serious constitutional concerns.413
When the gov ernment pursues cases that are neither clear-cut nor
morally reprehensible, it is easy for naturalized citizens to identify
with denaturalization defendants. Few people would personally identify with a Nazi concentration camp guard. But a grandmother with a
rare kidney disease, nerv ous about keeping her job, who looked the
other way when her boss committed financial crimes? Or a nonEnglish-speaking immigrant whose translator may hav e filed an
asylum action under the wrong name, causing him to miss a court
date? It is easy for people to imagine themselv es in the shoes of many
of those at risk of losingtheir citizenship.414
Because many naturalized citizens may be able to identify with
today’s denaturalization defendants, they are likely to feel ex cluded
from the American polity. That feelingof ex clusion creates a chilling
effect as indiv iduals fear for their own status. Actions “targeting the
foreign-born” hav e been recognized by scholars as “threaten[ing] the
social contract and ex pos[ing] the v ulnerability of immigrants’ rights
to political manipulation.”415 It can cause the fears ex pressed in earlier cases to come to pass: Naturalized immigrants may feel ex cluded
from the body politic, afraid to participate in public life lest they run
afoul of indiv iduals in power who might seek to deport them.416 Of
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412 As journalist Masha Gessen has pointed out in the contex t of anti-LGBT legislation
in Russia, laws that are only selectiv ely enforced are necessarily intended to send a
political message. Lane Sainty, 8 Things We Learned About Russian American Journalist
Masha Gessen, BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.buzzfeed.com/lanesainty/8things-you-should-know-about-masha-gessen (“Once you write a law that can only be
enforced selectiv ely, then the point of it is not to hav e legislation, the point of it is to hav e a
message in the public.”); see also United States v . Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996)
(“The requirements for a selectiv e-prosecution claim draw on ‘ordinary equal protection
standards.’” (quotingWayte v . United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985))).
413 See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (“[A] decision whether to prosecute may not be
based on ‘an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’”
(quotingOyler v . Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962))).
414 See deGooyer, supra note 8 (describingthat “many naturalized citizens” might now
“question[ ] the v alidity of an immigration status they assumed would always be safe” as a
result of current denaturalization policies).
415 Marta Tienda, Demography and the Social Contract, 39 DEMOGRAPHY 587, 607
(2002).
416 See Schneiderman v . United States, 320 U.S. 118, 167 (1943) (Rutledge, J.,
concurring) (“No citizen with such a threat hangingov er his head could be free.”). Along
these lines, concerns hav e risen that the gov ernment is using social media to engage in
greater surv eillance of both citizens and immigrants. See Daniella Silv a, ACLU Demands
Records of Social Media Surveillance Under Trump, NBC NEWS (May 24, 2018), https://
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course, this was the v ery consequence that Justice Rutledge warned
about in Schneiderman.417
The seemingly narrow ex ception to the Court’s prohibition on
Congress’s power to “take away a man’s citizenship”418 for fraud and
illegal procurement is not as limited as it might hav e felt to the
Afroyim Court when it ex cluded fraud actions from the case’s broad
holding.419 History instructs us—and modern cases confirm—that
bureaucratic error and ordinary human frailty giv e rise to v ery
common v ulnerabilities throughout the immigration process. A case
filed under the wrong name can be difficult to distinguish from an
indiv idual trying to get a second bite at the apple in an asylum proceeding.420 A moment of weakness from an indiv idual in a v ulnerable
position can raise later questions about “moral character.”421 And, as
the Justices on the Supreme Court pointed out in the oral argument in
Maslenjak, minor crimes such as speedingare nearly ubiquitous, and
most cases do not result in gettingticketed.422 Maslenjak’s materiality
requirement can help ensure that some minor v iolations do not result
in criminal prosecution for illegally procuring naturalization.423 But
Maslenjak’s standard does not apply in civ il cases, and ev en when
there is an analogous materiality prov ision, it would not help in situations like Singh’s or Borgoño’s.424
In addition to av oiding the chilling effect of denaturalization, a
primary force behind the Supreme Court’s protection of citizenship
status might also be a “fear that the state would abuse any denationalization power it is recognized to hav e.”425 Certainly, the v ery concept
of citizenship can be used as a weapon to attack members of an
41254-nyu_94-3 Sheet No. 79 Side B
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www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/aclu-demands-records-social-media-surv eillanceunder-trump-n877036.
417 See supra note 176 and accompanyingtex t.
418 Afroyim v . Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267 (1967).
419 Id. at 267–68.
420 See supra Section I.B.1.
421 See supra Section I.B.2.
422 Transcript of Oral Argument at 54, Maslenjak v . United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918
(2017) (No. 16-309) (Roberts, C.J.) (“If you take the position that . . . not answeringabout
the speedingticket or the nickname is enough to subject that person to denaturalization,
the gov ernment will hav e the opportunity to denaturalize anyone they want, because
ev erybody is goingto hav e a situation where they didn’t put in somethinglike that.”).
423 See Maslenjak v . United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1925, 1927 (2017) (ex plaining the
materiality requirement).
424 See id. at 1925 n.2 (“[W]e hav e interpreted a civ il statute closely resembling
§ 1425(a)—which authorizes denaturalization when, inter alia, citizenship is ‘illegally
procured,’ 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a)—to cov er that qualifications-based species of illegality.”).
425 T. Alex ander Aleinikoff, Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1471,
1499 (1986) (arguing that fear of the state’s abuse of denaturalization is the only logical
ex planation for the Court’s “intent-to-relinquish test” in Afroyim and Terrazas).
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opposingpolitical party. Suggestingthat certain indiv iduals—or members of certain disfav ored groups—are not legitimately part of the
nation’s citizenry is a way of castingdoubt on their right to participate
in public life.426 And to the ex tent that civ il and political rights flow
from citizenship, it suggests that those civ il rights deserv e lessened
state protection.
For ex ample, when thirteen Russians were criminally charged in
the United States for conspiringto undermine the 2016 U.S. election,
Russian president Vladimir Putin attempted to cast doubt on the legitimacy of their Russian citizenship, reportedly saying: “Maybe they are
not ev en Russians . . . but Ukrainians, Tatars or Jews, but with Russian
citizenship, which should also be checked.”427
The ov ertly anti-Semitic message underlying the statement was
certainly disquieting, and it was rightly subjected to immediate international pushback.428 But the belief that some legal citizens are not
full or “real” members of a society is an idea that is gaininginternational traction with the rise of ethno-nationalism429—includingwithin
the United States, a nation founded on the integration of an immigrant population into the political fabric of the country.430 For
ex ample, in July 2018 President Trump falsely tweeted: “Just out that
the Obama Administration granted citizenship, during the terrible
Iran Deal negotiation, to 2500 Iranians – including to gov ernment
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426 Cf. Schneiderman v . United States, 320 U.S. 118, 159 (1943) (“Were the law
otherwise, v aluable rights would rest upon a slender reed, and the security of the status of
our naturalized citizens might depend in considerable degree upon the political temper of
majority thought and the stresses of the times.”).
427 Nicholas Fandos & Matthew Lux moore, After Putin Cites Jews, Democrats Implore
Trump to Extradite Russians, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
03/12/us/politics/democrats-trump-election-interference-russia-jews.html.
428 Id. (“Many commentators considered it a clear echo of the anti-Semitism that has
plagued Russia’s history since at least the 19th century.”).
429 See Gideon Rachman, Opinion, Donald Trump Leads a Global Revival of
Nationalism, FIN. TIMES (June 25, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/59a37a38-7857-11e88e67-1e1a0846c475 (“The nationalists’ dominant issue is usually immigration—and the
need to defend the nation against ‘swarms’ of migrants from outside the west.”); Robert J.
Shiller, What’s Behind a Rise in Ethnic Nationalism? Maybe the Economy, N.Y. TIMES:
THE UPSHOT (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/16/upshot/whats-behind-arise-in-ethnic-nationalism-maybe-the-economy.html (describing an increase in “political
appeals” to the idea that “identity is defined by perceiv ed genetic, religious or linguistic
heritage rather than democratic ideals or principles”).
430 See Kristina Bakkær Simonsen, Does Citizenship Always Further Immigrants’ Feeling
of Belonging to the Host Nation? A Study of Policies and Public Attitudes in 14 Western
Democracies, 5 COMP. MIGRATION STUD., no. 3, 2017, at 1, 1–2, https://www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov /pmc/articles/PMC5331101 (“[R]ecent decades’ political debates about the granting
of citizenship to immigrants tell another story of citizenship as a highly contested policy
domain, which is not just about rules but also about identity.”).
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officials. How big (and bad) is that?”431 In fact, the negotiation had
not included any deal for citizenship. And if President Trump’s tweet
could be charitably read only to mean that such naturalizations had
occurred ov er the same time period, it seriously undercounted the
number of Iranian citizens naturalized during that period—in 2015,
ov er ten thousand of them.432 Ev en if the content of the tweet is
demonstrably false, its “metamessage” still matters.433 The underlying
meaningof the tweet undermines the legitimacy of citizenship in two
ways, focusing on political affiliation as well as national origin: The
tweet suggests that both indiv iduals naturalized under a prev ious
political administration as well as citizens born in Iran should be
v iewed with suspicion. It echoes the message of Putin’s statement,
suggesting that for some people citizenship may be merely a legal
technicality and not a fundamental identity shared by all.434
The v iew that citizenship may be a mere legal technicality undermines a political system founded on the participation of its citizens.435
When this v iew is combined with efforts to strip away the naturalization of long-time citizens, it becomes ev en more destructiv e to the
political order and to the foundations of the United States constitutional democracy. Impugning the citizenship of indiv iduals based on
national origin raises the concern ex pressed by Alex ander Aleinikoff,
which is the “fear that the state would abuse any denationalization
power it is recognized to hav e.”436
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431 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 3, 2018, 5:03 AM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1014117468858650624.
432 See Salv ador Rizzo, Trump Falsely Claims Obama Gave Citizenship to 2,500 Iranians
During Nuclear Deal Talks, WASH. POST (July 4, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/fact-checker/wp/2018/07/04/trump-claims-obama-gav e-citizenship-to-2500-iraniansduring-nuclear-deal-talks/ (fact-checking President Trump’s tweet and stating that “[i]n
2015 . . . 10,344 Iranian-born people were naturalized”).
433 Linguist Deborah Tannen’s research separates a speaker’s message (the
“[i]nformation conv eyed by the meanings of words”) and metamessage (“[w]hat is
communicated about relationships—attitudes toward each other, the occasion, and what
we are saying”). She notes that people’s emotional reactions are more connected to the
metamessage than the message. DEBORAH TANNEN, THAT’S NOT WHAT I MEANT!: HOW
CONVERSATIONAL STYLE MAKES OR BREAKS RELATIONSHIPS 15–16 (1986); see also
Cassandra Burke Robertson, Beyond the Torture Memos: Perceptual Filters, Cultural
Commitments, and Partisan Identity, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 389, 397–98 (2009)
(ex plaininghow the metamessages of statements made by political leaders can shape the
public’s understandingof a shared national identity).
434 See Fishkin, supra note 345, at 1333–36 (discussingthe centrality of citizenship to the
American identity).
435 See supra note 345 and accompanyingtex t.
436 See Aleinikoff, supra note 425, at 1499.
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CONCLUSION
The possibility of civ il denaturalization, which lay mostly dormant for fifty years, is increasingly becoming a political reality. As
more cases are litigated, courts will hav e to answer sev eral questions.
The first is whether civ il denaturalization is constitutional as a matter
of substantiv e due process and of the Citizenship Clause. If so, then
what lev el of procedural protection is required to take away
someone’s citizenship? Ev en hardened immigration enforcement
adv ocates should take pause at the idea that a person can lose her
citizenship without ev er beingpersonally serv ed with process, hav ing
the opportunity to obtain legal counsel, or ev en appearing in court.
Stripping political rights without adequate procedural safeguards
destabilizes the v ery concept of citizenship by sending the message
that naturalized citizens may nev er be an integral part of the polity. It
also upends the fundamental principle of the United States’ founding:
that the state has only the power delegated to it by its citizens, and has
no power to take that citizenship away. If naturalized citizens cannot
feel secure in their substantiv e and procedural rights, natural-born citizens (and especially those considered undesirable by the gov ernment
for any reason) may not be far behind in losingtheirs. Thus, it is time
for courts to draw a clear border around citizenship.
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